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ABSTRACT

SHEEP AND WOOL IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY FALMOUTH, MA:
EXAMINING THE
COLLAPSE OF A CAPE COD INDUSTRY

August 2012

Leo Patrick Ledwell, Jr., B.A., University of Massachusetts Boston
M.A., University of Massachusetts Boston

Directed by Professor Judith Zeitlin

This thesis examines the collapse of the sheep industry in Falmouth,
Massachusetts in the 1830s. The documentary evidence for the collapse is examined
through both the lens of microhistory and that of the traditional model for the collapse,
one set forth by the American Geographical Society. The traditional model suggests that
the importation of cheap agricultural goods from western states like Ohio caused the
collapse of commercial farming in New England. An examination of the local evidence,
however, suggests that the real reasons for the collapse of the sheep industry in Falmouth
are much more complex, leaving open the possibility of alternate explanations. The AGS
model was not predictive in this case because of the fertility of the soil, the lack of
connection between factories and farmers, and the timing of the collapse.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

As it did in much of New England, the sheep industry in Falmouth, Massachusetts
collapsed in the early 1800’s. This thesis will examine whether or not the standard
explanation for that collapse, that is, the failure of sheep farmers to compete with cheaper
western wool brought in by rail and canal, and suggested originally by the American
Geographical Society (or AGS), works as an explanation for the Falmouth case. The
AGS macrohistorical model will be compared with the results of a microhistorical
examination of nineteenth-century farming in Falmouth. The study follows the principle
formulated by the pre-eminent microhistorian Carlo Ginzburg that “By knowing less, by
narrowing the scope of our enquiry, we hope to understand more” (2005). The narrow
scope of this study is its concentration on the evidence from one New England town,
through which I hope to shed light on whether or not the AGS model is explanatory in
this specific case and therefore is appropriately applied on a broader scale. This analysis
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seeks through microhistory to reconstruct, understand, and examine the economic culture
of a society that existed in the early 1800s.
The Setting
The modern economy of Falmouth, Massachusetts, a coastal community on Cape
Cod, is based primarily on tourism and health care, but this was not always the case.
Falmouth was incorporated in 1688 by the General Court of Massachusetts. Like most of
the upper Cape, it contains numerous salt marshes and uplands that are ideal for pasture
land, something that early colonists exploited when they settled there. Its climate today
makes it popular with tourists, for the Cape is warmer in fall and winter and cooler in the
summer than the rest of the mainland. At one time, Falmouth’s economy was based on a
combination of farming, animal husbandry (such as sheep farming), manufacturing, and
maritime activities.
By the twentieth century, this balance had shifted. Until recently, historians have
suggested that New England agricultural economies like raising sheep collapsed in the
nineteenth century as a result of an influx of cheap raw materials from the west, which
deprived local farmers of a market for their raw wool. When farmers lost their markets,
they emigrated to a different part of the country or, if they stayed, they let or sold their
houses and land over to newly wealthy merchants from Boston.1 A model devised by the
American Geographical Society (AGS) in the late 1920s and early 1930s suggests that
the decline of the sheep industry in New England was caused by the ever-changing
relationship between sheep farmers and woolen factories. Woolen factories needing raw
wool lay adjacent to rivers that ran through the New England countryside, which was
burdened with numerous sheep herds. The AGS model assumed that these vast herds of
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sheep served to provide the woolen factories with the raw wool that they needed and
without which they would fail (Turner 1931; Wilson 1935). It is a fairly logical
assumption, and once accepted as universal for New England as a whole, that is, that
sheep farmers acted as suppliers for the woolen factories or that the sheep herds existed
to supply the woolen industry with raw materials, the reasons for the failure of the sheep
industry in New England seem clear.
It is true that in the early 1800s many New England sheep farmers were the
exclusive suppliers of raw wool to the new woolen factories that were sprouting up after
the War of 1812. The farmers made a profit for very little work, and this encouraged the
expansion of sheep raising in New England, especially that of merino sheep (Gaines
2007[21]: 32-34). The AGS model posited that it was less expensive to raise sheep in a
frontier state like Ohio, which had more fertile soils. However, with no way to transport
that raw wool to New England, these cheaper sources posed no threat to the New England
sheep farmers’ position as sole suppliers to the New England woolen factories.
According to the traditional AGS model, all of this began to change when the Erie Canal
was built and made it feasible to transport the cheap wool from Ohio eastwards. Suddenly
the sheep farmers of New England had competition (Turner 1931; Wilson 1935).
The situation rapidly deteriorated in the 1840s as rail lines expanded across New
England and connected Albany to Boston, flooding the New England market with cheap
wool. The price of wool fell lower and lower, until the sheep farmers of New England
found that they could not compete with the Ohio farmers. With no market for their wool,
there was no reason to keep sheep, and so the large sheep herds all but vanished from the
countryside (Turner 1931; Wilson 1935). This explanation of the disappearance of the
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sheep industry and other types of New England agriculture forms an important building
block in the historical narrative of the nation. This lack of ability to compete
agriculturally is used to explain the great migration of New Englanders to all parts of the
country, which in turn is used to explain how the American character came to be infused
with the Puritan values of thrift, hard work, and moral certainty, at least ideally (Bell
1989).
While the AGS model is still influential today in both the fields of history and
geography, this nearly eighty-year-old model is not universally accepted. Still, it forms a
basis for understanding New England history and must be included in any study of local
and New England economies of the nineteenth century. The idea that the infertility of
New England soils made the region unable to compete agriculturally with the Midwest
forms part of the underlying structure of the historical narrative for New England
specifically and for the country as a whole. Historians Andrew Baker and Holly Izzard
(1991:33) use the model to explain not only why farmers in New England made the
choices they did but also why sheep farming was abandoned. In his book, geographer
Joseph Wood utilizes the AGS model in part to explain the New England diaspora to
other parts of the country (1997:27). The AGS model is used in a popular exhibit that
deals with New England agriculture at the historically reconstructed Sturbridge Village.
This exhibit uses the AGS model so completely that it even has a replica of the dioramas
at Petersham, created originally to explain the AGS model to the public in the 1930s.
These dioramas illustrate the rise and fall of New England agriculture. The AGS model
has become a building block of the general historical narrative, and one that is often not
questioned.
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Does the AGS model apply in the case of the collapse of the sheep industry in
Falmouth in the 1830s? On the surface it should. The town of Falmouth had both woolen
factories and large sheep herds, and the sheep industry did collapse. It would seem the
elements supporting the AGS model are present, so the conclusion that the direct cause of
the collapse of the local sheep industry was the introduction of cheap western wool would
be a reasonable one. The example set by noted archaeologist Matthew Johnson (1996),
who analyzed the Enclosure movement in England, might urge one to follow a different
line of reasoning, however, and to examine more closely the local evidence in Falmouth
before coming to that conclusion. One major discrepancy is in the timing of the collapse
of the sheep industry in Falmouth. The industry collapsed earlier than the traditional
model suggests it should, if indeed the influx of cheap wool from the west were the
precipitating event. Does the traditional model with its reliance on a single direct cause
really explain events at the local level? In his study of the Enclosure movement in
Britain, Johnson concluded that the macro model does not always explain enclosure at the
local level when viewed through local documentation from the time period (Johnson
1996). With Johnson’s methods in mind, the local evidence in Falmouth will be
examined more closely to ascertain if the evidence actually supports the traditional
assertions that the single, direct cause of the collapse of the sheep industry in Falmouth
was the introduction of inexpensive raw wool from the west.
Microhistory and the Anthropological Eye
The microhistorical approach will be one tool used to examine the world of early
nineteenth-century Falmouth and the complex interactions between the land and people.
Microhistorian Martin Bruegel (2006: 527) emphasizes this shift from an abstract
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approach “to an actor-centered mode of retrieving history in which historical subjects
seek out chances, confront limits, endow constraints with significance and transform their
world by engaging it.”
Another way of looking at the microhistorical approach is offered by Matti
Peltonen. In his article, “Clues, Margins, and Monads: The Micro-Macro Link in
Historical Research,” Peltonen cites Ginzburg and Levi’s definition of microhistory,
where they state that
The unifying principle of all microhistorial research is the belief that microscopic
observation will reveal factors previously unobserved. . . Phenomena considered
to be sufficiently described and understood assume completely new meanings by
altering the scale of observation. It is then possible to use these results to draw far
wider generalizations (Peltonen 2001: 349).
In this case, the AGS model on the surface seems to describe sufficiently the decline of
the agricultural industry in New England, but when the scale of observation is altered to
the local rather than the regional level, the resulting facts allow the researcher to draw
totally different conclusions.
It would be easy to simply accept traditional explanations for the decline of
agriculture in New England, and to dismiss those instances which do not fit the
explanations as exceptions to the rule. Peltonen, however, suggests that
the important common feature of the new microhistory is the ‘method of clues.’
By this they mean starting an investigation from something that does not quite fit,
something odd that needs to be explained. This peculiar event or phenomenon is
taken as a sign of a larger or hidden unknown structure (Peltonen 2001: 349).
The timing of the decline in Falmouth’s sheep industry is temporally disjunctive, for the
collapse happened during what should be, according to the AGS model, a period of
prosperity that falls a decade before the decline suggested by the model. This fact is the
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first clue that the AGS model does not fit this case, and that something else is going on in
Falmouth. Because the facts surrounding Falmouth’s declining sheep industry do not
adhere to the traditional narrative, it is essential to use microhistorial methods to
determine what hidden or unknown structures are at work. Using microhistory allows the
researcher to recreate the economic and societal conditions of 1830s Falmouth in greater
detail in order to understand how different elements of the local society and the economy
interacted and were influenced by each other, and how these elements differ from the
grand narrative explanation formulated by the AGS.
In their analysis of anthropology and ethnohistorians, Anna Green and Kathleen
Troup discuss the importance of microhistory. They write of
Keith Thomas [who] also drew attention to the importance in anthropology of
everyday life, wryly concluding that domestic and community relations form the
very stuff of social anthropology, and, for that matter, of most people’s lives, but
one would never deduce this from the subject matter of most historical inquiry. In
this sense, anthropology was to become immensely influential in redirecting
historians’ attention away from the public, political sphere of human action and
toward private, daily life (Green and Troup 1999: 174).

Similarly, this study concentrates on the private, individual decisions of farmers and
factory owners in Falmouth, who would normally not find voice in the historical
narrative, yet are important for answering the historical question of why the sheep
industry collapsed in Falmouth in the 1830s. Examining the details of the lives of specific
farmers and factory owners in Falmouth allows the researcher to piece together a clearer
picture of the historical interplay between the local economy and the individual actors
before deciding whether this instance supports or undermines the AGS model.

7

The Landscape and its Physical Remains
As pointed out by Joseph Wood in his book, The New England Village, the
utilization and conceptualization of the landscape changes over time as culture itself
changes. This principle can be seen in the town of Falmouth throughout its history. When
the first settlers arrived in Falmouth, they tried to impose their Puritan ideas of
community and proper land use on the landscape. They laid out equal portions of
property bounded by fences and walls, which in turn were supposed to determine how the
land was used. The stone walls which run across the West Falmouth hills are both a
testimony to this original ideal and also an example of how quickly this ideal was
modified by a combination of individual desires and needs, the regional economy, and
the environment itself.
The lost world of sheep farming and woolen factories can still be seen in the
transformed landscape of Falmouth, from the low stone walls that run through the hills of
West Falmouth to the buried foundations of mills in the cranberry bogs of East Falmouth.
Each is an example of people in the past leaving physical signs of their culture on the
landscape (Kealhofer 1999). The rock walls in West Falmouth (and in a more limited
way Falmouth in general) are made of a lower course of closely spaced large boulders
with a course of two smaller boulders on top. This composition is common in this area,
made with materials usually procured from the terminal moraine that runs through West
Falmouth (Smith 1986:27-31). In the hills, the main direction of the older walls runs
roughly from east to west, with the younger walls either running at angles or parallel, but
both are structured the same way. This can be seen with a comparison between the
proprietors’ records, the geodetic survey map, and the town map of the early 1900s. The
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proprietors’ records indicate that they laid out West Falmouth so that generally the
property boundaries and walls ran parallel to the Sandwich border, roughly east to west
(see figures 2, 3 and 4).

Figure 2. Map of the lots as described by the proprietors and the ancient deeds found in
the Proprietors’ Records. On the map, north is at the top of the picture. Drawing by
Dorothy S. Svenning.
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Figure 3. Portion of the Geodetic Survey, 1845. North is the top of the picture. Falmouth
Historical Society.

Figure 4. Portion of the Landbook of Falmouth showing the hills of West Falmouth,
1927. North is at the top of the picture. Falmouth Town Hall.
10

Each lot was to include hill pasture land, farm land, and marshland for salt hay.
These older walls can be seen in the deepest parts of the hills today as one travels north.
They can also be seen as both property boundaries and walls recorded on the land map
for Falmouth (see figure 4).2
It can be inferred that the walls that run at angles, or parallel for short distances to
the older walls, were built later because they are not mentioned in the proprietors’
records, yet they appear in the Geodetic Survey of 1845 and the 1927 land map of
Falmouth. The walls speak of sheep in two ways. The first is in the intentions of the
proprietors themselves. Originally, each settler, in West Falmouth in particular, was
granted a long strip of property that ran from the marshes into the hills. The intent of
these long strips was to provide each farmer with pasturage in the hills for sheep in the
spring, summer, and fall as well as marshland to provide salt hay for the winter (Gaines
2007:1). In The New England Village, Joseph Wood indicates that this layout was
common for the English settlers of the 1600’s (Wood 1997:37-38). The second is in how
the walls were actually used. Despite the intent of the proprietors, it appears that they
were never used to contain individual herds of sheep. Local records indicate that, in fact,
in the spring, summer, and fall, the sheep of individual farmers were put into the hills (or
on the town green) as a group under the care of town-appointed shepherds, with only
earmarks to distinguish them.3 In West Falmouth, this shepherd worked in the sheep
yard, which is marked presently by a low stone foundation on a hill above the Long Pond
Reservoir.4
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In addition to marking property boundaries, the walls themselves were put to
more practical use by shepherds as a means of preserving sheep pasturage by cordoning
off over-grazed areas and moving sheep to areas where there was newly-grown grass. In
cold weather the walls were used as impromptu shelters for the sheep, called creeps.
Creeps were located wherever two walls crossed. They consisted of small three-sided
rooms. Two of the sides were the stone walls meeting at an angle, while the third
consisted of a piece of canvas. Another piece of canvas was stretched over the top to
make a roof, providing shelter for the sheep in bad weather. Thus, the walls and the sheep
were intimately linked (Gaines 1986:34-35). Arising out of the growing number of sheep,
the changes in the function of the walls show the farmers’ evolution of land use in
response to changing economic conditions.
The evidence for the industrialization of the two rivers in Falmouth is still seen
today buried among the brambles, trees, and cranberry plants. The remains of the
Moonakis Factory can still be discerned where Martin Road crosses the Moonakis River.
On the south slope of the road (which originally functioned as the dam) lies the remnant
wheel head, which would have housed the overshot wheel that powered the woolen mill
(see figure 5).
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Figure 5. Remnant wheel head on the south side of the Moonakis dam.Picture
taken by Leo Patrick Ledwell, Jr.
The foundations for these mills are all that is left of what, according to photos,
were very impressive structures. Originally the north side of Martin Road would have
been the mill pond, but when the property was converted to cranberry growing, the pond
was drained and now the Moonakis flows under the road and out to sea (Cherau 2006:25).
The remains of the Pacific Woolen Company can be found along two sites on the
Coonamesset River. The first site is the lower mill site off John Parker Road. This site is
probably the best preserved, in the sense that some of the mill buildings survived long
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after the demise of the company itself. One of the mill buildings was used until 1977 as
the town’s recycling center. The dam for the site and the pump house are still intact, as is
the waste house (for converting old wooden cloth into shoddy). This location now serves
as the basis for a herring run. Foundations are also on the site. One such foundation is
referred to as the Northern Mill and consists of a large, overgrown depression. The
superstructure was removed, but there is no record of the machinery being taken away, so
it is likely that excavations would bring them, along with the stone basement, to light.
Another foundation at this extensive site is the dye house, but that is partly buried by a
modern access road. The second site is the upper mill of John Parker Road. This site
was originally a grist mill owned by John Parker, but it was acquired in 1838 by the
Pacific Woolen Mill in order to provide more control and power over the river for the
extensive mill downstream. Remains are harder to discern at this site. The remains of
one or two dams can be seen off to the northwest side of the present-day cranberry bog.
There are a number of depressions as well as some earth-berming and other mounds. A
culvert can be found in the woods. Archaeologically, it is evident that sheep were in
important consideration in the ordering of the landscape and that woolen factories in fact
existed in Falmouth. One question that concerns this thesis is that relationship between
the sheep for whom the walls were built and the factories which grew up along the rivers
(Cherau 2006:2-5).
The Archival Evidence
In order to discover the complex relationships between farmers, factory owners,
and the regional economy, this study employed documents from the Falmouth Historical
Society (FHS), The Bowerman Collection (BC) from West Falmouth Library, and from
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the archives at Falmouth’s Town Hall (FTH). The nature of each of these repositories is
different, and so each one must be examined in turn. In brief, the FHS contains letters,
diaries, account books, and other documents of a personal nature, and an accessions
committee decides if a donation will be accepted or a purchase made. The committee
considers whether those items or documents relate to Falmouth or Falmouth families, and
if the documents further research on Falmouth’s history. By contrast, the BC contains
documents pertaining only to two families. The repository at FTH contains many official
local government documents and also documentation necessary for the efficient running
of town government.
The Falmouth Historical Society
Founded in 1900, The Falmouth Historical Society keeps its primary source
documents in the archives. At present, the FHS collection houses account books, diaries,
old bills, photographs, oral histories, handwritten family histories, and letters, just to
name a few common items (Mary Sicchio 2011, pers. comm). The data therein
represents more heavily families that were either wealthier or that have been in the town
a very long time. Few materials represent those who were poor or more recently arrived
in town.
This study relies heavily on several documents from this archive. Principal among
these are four minute books of Prince and Maltiah Gifford, brothers and partners in the
second largest sheep farm in West Falmouth, and the fourth largest in Falmouth as a
whole. The FHS houses several of their individual minute or account books that function
simultaneously as checkbooks and an accounts payable list. There are gaps in the dates,
and only four minute books remain. That said, both brothers were meticulous record
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keepers, and the remaining minute books offer a detailed window into the day-to-day
operations of their farm. The first minute book is Maltiah’s and covers the period from
1805-1817. The other three belonged to Prince and cover the periods 1829-1830, 18341836, and 1837-1848.
Other documents used from this archive were the minute books of Arnold
Gifford, a relative of Prince and Maltiah Gifford. His minute books cover both his
farming operations and the transactions he made as a middleman between farmers like
Prince and Maltiah Gifford and inhabitants and stores around Cape Cod, especially
Nantucket. His minute books cover the periods of 1837-1840 and 1844-1848. Arnold
Gifford’s minute books straddle the world of farmers and merchants because he
functioned as both.
The next document used from this archive is the time book from the Moonakis
Woolen Factory. The main purpose of this time book, which covers the period from
March 1832 until June of 1840, was to record hours worked and amount of cloth
produced. Marginal notes accompany the record of workers’ hours and cloth production.
These notes also reveal the world of suppliers and buyers and some details of the
operations of the factory. The book is quite extensive, but it is but a fragment of the
paper work that would have been generated by both the Moonakis Woolen Factory and
the Pacific Woolen Mills.
The next two documents are both account books from packet ships but very
different in their span of time. The first is Shubael Nye’s account book, which covers
three generations of economic activity from 1768-1871. The second is Charles Lewis’s
account book which covers only the year 1818. Both men were owner-operators of
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packet ships that traversed the waters between the Cape and Nantucket. These two
surviving account books reveal what goods were in demand locally as well as in demand
in Falmouth’s primary market, Nantucket. Although they convey a good sense of the
structure of the regional economy, as the only such records from numerous packet ships
that plied Falmouth’s waters, how representative they are is unknown. Neither packet
ship was among those that sailed out of West Falmouth.
The last document from the FHS is the proprietors’ records. This document
records land grants in the late 1600s and early 1700s. The FHS owns a transcription of
the original document file, loosely collected in one folder and unnumbered. These are the
earliest official documents of the town, the predecessors of the town hall records. The
original landowners in Falmouth compiled these documents to mark out land grants and
to settle disputes. While the folder does not contain a map, the records can be used to
reconstruct the early landscape and its uses as intended by the proprietors (see figure 2).
The Bowerman Collection
The next archive consulted for this study is The Bowerman Collection at the West
Falmouth Library. The entire archive was a gift of Dorothea Gifford to the West
Falmouth Library in 1994 and consists of the personal and business papers of the two
most important Quaker families and sheep farmers in West Falmouth, the Bowermans
and the family of Prince and Maltiah Gifford. The first records in the collection date
from 1673 and the last date is 1961. It also contains the historical notes and oral histories
collected by Virtue B. and Alice C. Gifford, cousins and both amateur historians. Alice
was born in the late 1800s and recorded her notes in the 1950s, while Virtue wrote her
notes a couple of decades earlier. More importantly, there are gaps in the data,
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information not considered worth saving or lost for other reasons. The most important
gap is the missing minute books of Daniel Bowerman, who was the largest sheep farmer
in West Falmouth and Prince and Maltiah Gifford’s contemporary. Nevertheless, the
information contained in the collection allows for a tentative reconstruction of the world
they inhabited and their actions in that world, especially with regards to sheep farming.
Also included in the collection are the reminiscences of Orrin C. Bourne from
1930.7 As a boy Bourne both worked and played in the Moonakis Factory, where his
father operated the spinning jack in the winter. This document gives insight into the
relationship between sheep farmers and the woolen factory as well as the operations of
the factory. Because Orrin Bourne was one of the workers and not one of the owners, he
can only report his view of their actions and words and what his father had heard. Orrin
Bourne worked at Moonakis Factory after the period under study, but this limitation is
offset by his conversations with the mill owners who did live in the time period in
question. Bourne is the only non-elite person represented in these sources, so his thoughts
offer a different perspective on Falmouth economy and society.
Virtue B. Gifford’s notes were written in 1936 and deal specifically with land and
sheep.8 Virtue was the great-granddaughter of Daniel Bowerman, and she intended, like
her cousin Alice, to write a history of her town. Her notes are helpful in painting a broad
picture of life in the period under study. Not only does she shed light on the lives and
economies that the account books in the Falmouth Historical Society archives and the tax
documents in Town Hall cannot, but she also drew much of the information from
conversations she had with the older people in the family who lived during the time
period being studied. Thus, it is a kind of oral history project.
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The final document consulted in this study from the Bowerman Collection
consists of notes taken by Alice C. Gifford in 19569 in preparation for a history of her
family and town. Her notes deal with various aspects of the West Falmouth economy
ranging from shipping lumber to Nantucket to raising sheep, for they represent just an
initial stage of her planned research.
The Falmouth Town Hall Records
The last archival data comes from the records in Falmouth’s Town Hall (FTH),
which began even before the town’s incorporation in 1688. The Town Hall archives any
document that aids in the operation of the town, such as census and tax records. In
addition, it keeps any documents that can be used to settle disputes such as land maps and
deeds. The Town Hall also retains any document that provides transparency in
government or accountability to the people of the town: records of town meeting,
selectmen’s meetings, and even the salaries of town employees. These three have been
fairly constant criteria since the incorporation and are still the criteria today (Trisha
Favulli 2011, pers. comm).
The data provide hard numbers on the economy over a span of time. They reveal
the political structure of the community and allow for the reconstruction of the physical
aspects of the land and the economy. The drawback of the kind of information found in
the Town Hall archives is that, while the documents identify who is in the town and what
they owned, they reveal very little about the motivations of the people involved or how
the economy actually worked. For example, the assessment books provide evidence that
Prince and Maltiah Gifford owned sheep, even though it does not disclose what they were
doing with them. However, when combined with documents from the other two archives,
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the numbers contained in the valuation books and assessment books provide the
economic and political context for the world in which the Giffords lived.
The two most important documents in the Town Hall archives are the State
Valuations of 1811, 1831, 1840, 1850, and 1860 and the Falmouth Town Assessments
(also known as State Bills) of 1831, 1832, 1835, 1836, 1837, 1838, and 1840. Since the
early 1800s, Falmouth has conducted a town assessment every year, in which the value of
the property of each inhabitant is assessed for tax purposes. Roughly every ten years, this
information was compiled with a second assessment sent to the state. In the modern era,
the two assessments are the same. This study looked at a range of years applicable to the
collapse of the sheep industry. Both the State Valuations and the Falmouth Town
Assessments record the possessions and property of each inhabitant in the town.
Assessments were, and are still, used as appraisals to calculate local taxes, and valuations
were used to estimate the value of property in order to share that information with the
state government. Only the valuations contain a totals column, and provided a complete
picture of the town’s economy throughout the decade studied. Both kinds of documents
provide a snapshot of the town in its given year and, when examined in temporal order,
they show the expansion and contraction of the economy over any given period of time.
This study uses these documents primarily to illustrate the economic history of the sheep
and woolen industries.
The Town Records and Vitals books for the years 1750-1838 and 1847-1871
succeeded the Proprietors’ Records, and are compilations of vital documents from their
respective time periods. For example, the Town Record and Vitals 1750-1838 book
contains the minutes from a number of town meetings, as well as a list of births and
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deaths, and the state valuation of 1811. A similarly eclectic mix makes up the Town
Records and Vitals 1847-1871. The importance of these books lies in what is revealed
about the politics of sheep through the minutes of various town meetings. These minutes
leave no doubt that sheep were economically and politically important for the town and
its inhabitants, even if they do not record which factions supported or opposed them.
The last document used from the Town Hall archive is the Land Book of 1927,
which include property maps preserved in 2006 by Trisha Favulli, the assistant assessor
for the town of Falmouth, who put them in plastic covers and bound them and other town
documents into a series of books (Trisha Favulli 2011, pers. comm.). The 1927 map was
drawn up as the old farms of West Falmouth were breaking apart, so many of the old
boundaries and landscapes can still be seen on the map. Also recorded on the map are the
surviving stone walls, many of which are no longer visible. While the newer patterns of
landholding can be seen to be taking hold, it is also possible to discern the older patterns
of landholding as well, when viewed in conjunction with the Geodetic Survey of 1845
and the Proprietors’ Records.
The Goals of This Study
The first goal of this study is to use both these primary sources and local histories
to reconstruct the economy of Falmouth that emerged in the late 18th and early 19th
centuries. The focus of this reconstruction is the sheep industry and its relationship to the
woolen factories that grew up along Falmouth’s rivers. It is important also to understand
the regional network of trade in which these two industries operated, in order to grasp the
economic factors that would have influenced decisions made by both sheep farmers and
woolen mill owners. Informing this reconstruction both theoretically and contextually is
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Joseph Wood’s The New England Village, which deals with the evolution in New
England from a settlement pattern based on a dispersed economy to a more centralized
settlement pattern, with an economy based on extra-local exchange (Wood 1997:88-113).
In many ways, this model predicts the emergence of the Falmouth economy and
settlement pattern in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Once a reasonable
reconstruction of the sheep industry and the woolen mills in Falmouth is in place, the
analysis will proceed to the next goal of the study: to compare the local and regional
economy, with its focus on the sheep industry and the woolen mills, to the traditional
narrative as expounded on by the AGS and such authors as James Goldthwait (1927),
Harold Wilson (1935), and John Black (1950). Will their explanation of the causes of the
collapse of the sheep industry, focused as it is on cheap imports from Ohio driving the
more expensive New England wool from the market, actually predict the causes of the
collapse locally as revealed by the reconstruction of the local and regional economy, or
will it, like similar macrohistorical models, fail to do so as Matthew Johnson found to be
the case with his case study of the Enclosure Act (1996)?
Organization of the Thesis
In order to address the applicability of the AGS model to Falmouth further
background is needed. Chapter Two examines how and why the colonial proprietors
imposed their own ideas of landscape on the environment of Falmouth in the 1600s and
how economic and political changes in the late 18th century and early 19th century
affected the economy in Falmouth, which in turn altered the landscape laid out by the
proprietors. These issues enable us to place the role of sheep in the local economy as well
as illustrate the origins of the woolen mills. Chapter Three examines the changes that
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occurred in the 1830s economy in Falmouth. Through a microhistory approach, the
pertinent surviving documents will be used to recreate a picture of the economic changes
that occurred locally in both the sheep industry and the woolen factories between 1831
and 1840, as well as to shed light upon the interplay of the individual actors involved in
the local and regional economy. This will set the stage for the inquiry into the causes of
the collapse.
Chapter Four examines the traditional AGS model and discusses how that model
acquired its dominant place in the broader historical narrative. Chapter Five will
compare this traditional explanation to the Falmouth historical record in order to
determine whether or not the AGS theory is applicable in this particular case, and it will
also discuss alternative explanations for the collapse based on the surviving evidence.
Finally, Chapter Six will explore the broader issues involved with Falmouth’s exceptional
history. If Falmouth does not fit the model, does that reflect broader problems with this or
other macrohistorical models?
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CHAPTER 2
MOLDING THE LANDSCAPE

In order to comprehend the complex interactions between the land, the actors
(both farmers and mill owners) and the economy in the 1830s, it is important to
understand how the relationships were established in the preceding 150 years. First, this
chapter examines the physical features of Falmouth and surveys the patterns set by the
early colonists. This chapter will also scrutinize the evolution of the local and regional
economy, especially in regards to sheep. Finally, this section will analyze other economic
activities that were interwoven with sheep.
Landforms of Falmouth
Falmouth, Massachusetts is located at the southwest corner of the Cape Cod
peninsula. It is bounded by water to the west by Buzzards Bay and to the south by
Vineyard Sound. To the North lie the towns of Bourne and Sandwich and to the east lies
the town of Mashpee. Geographically, Falmouth is divided into two kinds of landforms,
both of which are relics of the great ice sheets which created Cape Cod during the Ice
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Age. The first landform is the terminal moraine. This moraine runs down the western
coast of Falmouth along Buzzards Bay from Bourne to Woods Hole and goes by a
number of informal names, including the West Falmouth hills and the Saconessett hills,
but it is geographically identified as the Buzzards Bay moraine. The soil in this moraine,
while not barren, contains rocks of all sizes, ranging from millions of pebbles to massive
boulders. Early on it was relegated to pasture land and woodlots by the settlers and their
descendants, who referred to it as “bony.” The width of the terminal moraine varies, from
three miles wide in the north along the border of Bourne to as narrow as a mile where the
moraine terminates in Woods Hole (Strahler 1966:11-23).
The other dominant landform is the outwash plain which runs from the terminal
moraine in the west along the borders of Sandwich, to Mashpee in the east, and all the
way south to Vineyard Sound. The outwash plain is made up mostly of sand and clay,
with topsoil, and is relatively rock free. It was this area and a narrow strip between the
moraine and Buzzards Bay that both Native Americans and the early European colonists
chose to utilize for agriculture, for there is good drainage, and the land, if well taken care
of, can be quite productive. The outwash plain is drained by a number of small but
steady rivers which run from north to south. Both the outwash plain and the terminal
moraine are studded with kettle holes, created by melting glaciers. In terms of climate,
Falmouth, like much of the Cape, is temperate, but moderated by the ocean that borders it
on two sides. As a consequence, it is warmer in the winter than the rest of Massachusetts,
and conversely it is cooler in the summer. The growing season for certain crops is shorter
than on the mainland, but winters are generally milder and therefore easier on livestock
like sheep (Strahler 1966:11-23).
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Early Patterns of Settlement
How did the early settlers to Falmouth and their descendants interact with this
environment and transmit their culture to the landscape, as well as lay the groundwork for
the world in which the sheep farmers and the woolen factory owners interacted?
Traditionally, it is assumed that Puritan settlers, like those who created Falmouth, created
compact nucleated settlements based on such considerations as the Puritan communal
ideal and the need for defense against Native communities. They tamed the wilderness
around them in order to practice communal agriculture for the benefit of the community
(Wood 1997:1-3).
The model town, like many other English cultural ideas brought over by the
settlers, quickly evolved into a new form. In England the town had been a complex
interaction of religion, politics, and economics, molded by centuries of tradition
according to Joseph Wood’s model. In New England, much of what had evolved from the
connection between the land and the culture was abandoned when the Puritan settlers
dispersed across the landscape in search of grassland that they could own and utilize for
their livestock. In most cases the town was reduced to a vehicle for distributing land and
arbitrating land disputes (Wood 1997:38-39). This concern with grasslands also
determined how individual properties were laid out. One cultural holdover from England
that was continued by the colonists was the division of land into rectangular lots, often in
the form of long strips enclosed by fences of either wood, or more often stone. Each
settler’s rectangular allotment in this period would include salt marsh or freshwater
meadows for fodder as well as pastureland for livestock (Wood 1997:37-38). This custom
of enclosing land not only imposed ideas of ownership onto the land itself, but in
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Falmouth also influenced how livestock were actually raised, especially sheep. In
Falmouth, the enclosures were used to control where the sheep grazed at certain times,
but they did so in collective herds.
The earliest European settlers in Falmouth were from Barnstable, a Cape town to
the east of Falmouth. One of the first settlers was Isaac Robinson, who originally had
been assigned the duty of converting Quakers to Puritanism in Barnstable. Through his
interaction with the Quakers, he came to the conclusion that they should have the right to
worship as they pleased. This idea did not win him friends in Barnstable, so Robinson
and a number of others petitioned the General Court for the right to purchase land in what
was then called Succonessett. After receiving permission in 1659 to purchase land from
the Wampanoags living there, the dissidents from Barnstable moved in 1661 to a neck of
land between Siders Pond and Salt Pond, about half a mile from today’s Falmouth center
(Smith 1986:19-21). They practiced a mixed form of agriculture, which combined the
growing of various crops in areas where Native Americans had grown corn, beans, and
squash, while also practicing animal husbandry, mainly with sheep but also with pigs and
cattle. The heads of families who owned land in the town, called the proprietors,
recorded their property in a document that came to be known as the Proprietors Records:
each settler was granted a hill allotment for livestock and a plain allotment for both crops
and fodder.10
Sheep were on the minds of the proprietors from almost the very beginning, and
this can be seen both from how the landscape was ordered and from the fact that there
were so many sheep in the initial settlement that by 1679 distinctive ear marks were
already being recorded in the Proprietors’ Records.11 Within ten years, the initial
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compact settlement between Siders Pond and Salt Pond quickly dispersed (Smith
1986:21). The 19th century historian Simeon Deyo stated that it was the hay in salt
meadows, like the one near the initial settlement, that drew Robinson and his followers to
this area and which caused the settlement to disperse (Deyo 1890:146). In the original
allotment, the salt marsh near the plantation was held in common, but that was not to last,
as each new settler and a good number of the original settlers soon struck out for their
own patches of salt marsh and sole possession of its fodder.12
After the initial settlement, farmers headed west towards Woods Hole and North
towards what would become West Falmouth (Smith 1986:19-21). West Falmouth itself
was settled by Quakers who had come from Barnstable with Robinson and Hatch. They
were joined by Quakers from nearby Sandwich and from Plymouth, where the Quakers
had also been persecuted (Smith 1986:19-21). Sheep and salt hay were on the Quakers’
minds as well when they moved here, for West Falmouth is bordered on the ocean side
by the Great and Little Sippewissett marshes. Stretching for more than two miles along
the coast and reaching in some places more than a half mile into the interior, the Great
and Little Sippewissett marshes are a rich source of salt hay. In 1691 and 1712, the
proprietors laid out the lands of West Falmouth in long strips, running parallel to the
Sandwich border. Each allotment consisted of marsh for salt hay, flat lands for crops and
hay as well as hilly pastureland for sheep. Both in Falmouth and West Falmouth,
grassland and not ideology drove the engine of settlement. The initial allotments laid out
in the minds of the settlers were imprinted onto the land in the form of stone walls, many
of which are extant today.
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In Falmouth the distribution of lands lay in the hands of the proprietors in
conjunction with the Court of Plymouth County. It was really only the proprietors who
controlled who received land. Their decisions were the earliest manifestation of civil
government in Falmouth, and almost all of the surviving Proprietors’ Records are
concerned with land distribution in one sense or another. In Falmouth, once the allimportant consideration of a system of land distribution was established, the proprietors
built a meeting house and laid out land for its maintenance, but they established an
ordinary or tavern first. In 1674 Isaac Robinson set up an ordinary for the purpose of
entertaining travelers going to and from Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard. The
establishment of this tavern is important, because it shows that within ten years of its
founding, Falmouth had enough traffic with Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard to warrant
the construction of an ordinary to deal with all of the people traveling to and from the
islands. No such accommodations were made for travelers to and from Barnstable or even
Boston. It also indicates the strong ties that developed early between the islands and
Falmouth (Deyo 1890:661), showing Falmouth’s place in the growing regional economy.
After the proprietors established an ordinary, they built a meeting house. In 1681,
a meeting house lot, a graveyard, and thirty acres of land for the support of the minister
were laid out. The siting of the original meeting house was placed where the path leading
to the original plantation intersected with the paths leading to Woods Hole and West
Falmouth. In other words, the meeting house was sited where the maze of paths leading
to different farms converged (Deyo 1890:644, Proprietors Records 1688). Once the
ordinary and the meeting house had been established, Falmouth’s incorporation followed
in 1688. Expansion led to the creation of more villages, the first of which was West
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Falmouth (Smith 1986:18-19), which followed a similar pattern of development. The first
Quaker meeting house was built in 1720 at a central location in West Falmouth, where
the road coming from Boston intersected with the paths leading to the dispersed
farmsteads and the path leading to the grist mills of what would become East Falmouth
(Smith 1986:438-444). Again, this auxiliary center was sited on an already established
crossroads. Both meeting houses would move again and for the same reason that they
were placed initially, that is, centrality of location.
As the main town of Falmouth grew, especially to the east and north, more and
more residents made new paths coming in from those directions. These paths did not
converge on the meeting house, but instead at a location about a half mile to the east, so
the proprietors decided to move the meeting house to this new central location in 1749.
While they were at it, they laid out the town commons as well (Smith 1986:39-40). In
West Falmouth, a new road was built closer to the scattered inhabitants in 1753, so the
Quaker meeting house was moved to this more central location in 1771 (Smith 1986:438444). In both cases, already established pathways dictated where the meeting house
would be, not the other way around.
The Emergence of the Local and Regional Economy
One of the engines driving the development of Falmouth was commercial
agricultural enterprises, which included sheep herding. Sheep had always been part of the
mixed agriculture practiced by the settlers, though they were not economically central.
They were a ready source of meat that required far less attention than the more valuable
cattle,13 and their wool could provide cloth when wool from elsewhere was scarce. All of
that changed with the Wool Act of 1699. Great Britain’s Wool Act forbade inter-colonial
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trade in woolen products. What this meant for Falmouth was it could no longer import
wool from its chief trading partner, Nantucket, which despite its numerous agricultural
difficulties had no problem maintaining the largest sheep herds on the Cape all through
the Colonial period and the Federal period as well. The Wool Act forced the people of
Falmouth to increase their sheep herds and supply themselves with wool for home
production of cloth. The growth in the sheep herds as well as the emerging economy of
the time accelerated the changes to the landscape. The proprietors initially tried to imprint
on the surface of Falmouth their ideas of an agricultural landscape, but the Wool Act
forced changes in the landscape that they had not foreseen.14
Wood postulates that the center villages that developed later in New England
during the Federal period evolved from colonial auxiliary centers like those in Falmouth
with their decentralized economies. He suggests they did so as a result of the acceleration
of the economy brought about by the emergence of local elite and, more importantly, by
the domestic, agricultural, and commercial demands of the American Revolution (Wood
1997:93-99). The commercialization of agriculture and the emergence of the factory
system that resulted from this acceleration in the late 1700s resulted in far more regular
trade connections and increasing occupational specialization. These in turn stimulated the
growth of central villages after 1800, usually in what had been the colonial site of the
meeting house and tavern in the auxiliary central place (Wood 1997:98-104). Factories
also emerged as a result of this accelerated economy, though often not at the location of
the central village. Instead, they were sited along water ways that could provide power
for the mills. Sometimes the factories would themselves become a new center and the old
center based on the meeting house and the tavern would be abandoned (Wood 1997:112).
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The most obvious change to the proprietors’ original landscape design was
physical. The early Proprietors’ Records indicate that each proprietor received both a hill
allotment and a plain allotment, and that each was to be more or less equal.15 As
mentioned earlier, the pattern of long rectangular strips can still be seen in the stone walls
that run through the most remote areas of Falmouth above the Long Pond Reservoir,
which is seated in the West Falmouth hills. The rapid expansion of the settlement and the
failure or success of various families in meeting the demands of the expanding economy
can be seen in the Geodetic Survey Map of 1845 and the Falmouth Land Book of 1927
(see figures 3 and 4), sources that describe eighteenth century changes that had been
imprinted on the landscape by the nineteenth century. Either large plots of land had been
acquired by wealthy families or they had been subdivided so that a long plot was owned
by more than one family. Newer walls appeared marking these newer divisions and their
accompanying concepts of land ownership.16
The intent of the proprietors for how the walls were to be used also was
subverted, especially in regards to sheep. In the late 1600s and early 1700s, as the number
of sheep increased, how they were herded also changed. Part of the original intent of the
boundaries marked by stone walls was to keep livestock separated, with each man in
charge of his own sheep. Local historian Jennifer Stone Gaines suggests that the
increased number of sheep made this impractical, so what developed was a system
whereby the town appointed shepherds to watch all the flocks during the spring, summer,
and fall, with the owner taking care of his own herd in the winter.17 Each farmer was to
identify his sheep with distinctive ear marks, which were recorded first in the Proprietors’
Records and then later in a special ear mark book in the possession of the town’s
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shepherds, of which only one copy survives (Gifford, S. 1825; Gaines 2007:32, 35).
Because sheep are so destructive to plant life, the walls laid out by the proprietors
acquired a new use. The sheep were herded from one walled area to another as the
seasons rolled on. When they had done enough damage to one enclosed area, the sheep
were moved to another in order to let the damaged plants in the enclosed area grow back.
In this way the farmers of the 1700s and early 1800s took the landscape imposed by the
proprietors and utilized it in a way not intended by the proprietors themselves (Gaines
2007:34).
Many Cape towns had responded to the Wool Act of 1699 by setting up fulling
mills in the early 1700s. Fulling mills took the loosely woven cloth that was produced on
farm looms and subjected the cloth to wetting and pounding with fulling mallets, which
cleaned, shrank, and felted the cloth. The whole process created a tighter, denser fabric
(Gaines 2007:37). The miller provided this service for either a cash payment or a portion
of the cloth, usually one yard for every ten produced. In a sense, the transaction was
similar to those made between farmers and grist millers or wood millers (Smith
1985:182-183). Falmouth has no record of having a fulling mill until Shubael Lawrence
opened one in 1788 on the Coonamessett River. Local Falmouth farmers did not turn to
sheep as a viable economic resource until the 1780s because of the depredations of the
British navy, which raided the coast for food supplies, and preyed upon Falmouth’s sheep
herds during the Revolution (Gaines 2007:32-35), delaying the Falmouth farmers’ entry
into the woolen market. Most of the farmers chose Spanish Merino sheep, which had a
finer quality fleece than the rather tough, rangy, horned Wiltshire sheep that had been
common before the Revolution. These larger herds were raised for raw wool to sell, or as
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means of producing coarse wool items like stockings or mittens, as well as for making
clothes for the farmers themselves (Gaines 2007:32-35). In addition to yarn for knitted
goods, demand for woven cloth encouraged the creation of the fulling mill. The
combination of the demand for raw wool, yarn, and cloth stimulated an increase in the
sheep herds, allowing sheep farmers to see their herds as an important means of income.
Mutton was another popular commodity that also fueled the growth of the sheep
herds. There is no evidence extant from the period which details where they sold the
excess wool or mutton, but based on later patterns of supply and demand, it can be
inferred that they sold these items to surrounding towns, to the islands, and to Boston. As
late as 1831, there was still a market in Boston and New Bedford for coarse woolens
from the Cape, and in Boston at least until the 1830’s, Sandwich mutton was highly
regarded.18 Locally, mutton was also very popular, based on the numerous entries for its
sale in Prince and Maltiah Gifford’s minute books.19
By 1811 the growth of both the town’s sheep herds and its accompanying home
market had stimulated the construction of a carding mill in addition to a fulling mill.20 A
carding mill is a machine that combs out the fleece and makes it ready for spinning. One
pound of wool can be carded this way in ten minutes as opposed to the hours it would
take to do so by hand. The remuneration for the miller was the same as it was for the
fulling or grist mills: cash payment or a portion of the product (Gaines 2007:38).
Evidence for this transaction can be seen in Maltiah Giffords 1805-1817 minute book,
where he records paying Isaac the miller for carding his and Prince’s wool in 1809.21
While the War of 1812 slowed the expansion of the sheep herds and the fulling
and carding mills, the sheep herds in Falmouth and especially West Falmouth bounced
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back quickly, as did wool sales. Maltiah Gifford recorded a number of sales in his minute
book, the largest being forty-five pounds to Abail Akins in 1817. He made a tidy sum of
$18.17.22 His brother Prince, made another large sale in 1829 of twenty-five pounds to
Charles Bowerman for $8.49.23 The Giffords made numerous smaller sales as well. In
each case, the sales of wool were always to local people.24 No sales to factories were
recorded. No wool sales were made outside the town to Boston or the islands. There is no
evidence that they sold their wool to local traders or merchants.
It is unclear why, with so many sheep owners in the town, the local households
bought wool from each other, even when they owned their own herds. Falmouth seems to
have had a significant home textiles industry at that time. It can be inferred that there
were some families who had more skills producing cloth, so they needed more wool than
they had in their own herds, but there is no direct evidence for this supposition. The
evidence in the minute books supports both the local historians’ assertions as well as the
assertion by the Historical and Archaeological Resources of Cape Cod and the Islands
(HARCCI 1987:296-298) that throughout the Federal period, the sale of wool, and the
production of woolen goods as well, was a function of home textile manufacture.25 By
1831 this system of local exchange encouraged the growth of Falmouth’s and West
Falmouth’s sheep herds and particularly Prince and Maltiah Gifford’s herds to the point
at which Falmouth possessed more sheep than any other town on the Cape, and the
Giffords possessed the second largest sheep herd in West Falmouth.26 This demand for
wool also spurred the increase in both fulling mills and carding mills. By 1831 there were
two fulling mills and three carding mills in operation along East Falmouth’s rivers,27 a
testament to the growing home market. Carding and fulling mills produced better quality
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cloth, better than home manufacturers ever could, and they did so more efficiently. Hand
carding and spinning wool was time consuming, but profitable. Farmers viewed carding
and fulling mulls as both a means to save time and to improve their product. The
existence of three carding and two fulling mills in Falmouth suggests that there was a
heavy demand for their services in support of the home textile industry. Things were
about to change, however, and this local system that had been evolving since the late
1700s, would be gone by 1840.
The shape of the regional economy, driving and driven by commercial agriculture
was already discernible when Isaac Robinson established his ordinary in 1674, but the
economy really took off in the 1700s.28 By the early nineteenth century, Falmouth was
exporting meat, wood, and livestock to Nantucket and the other islands. Nantucket
especially was a major destination for agricultural goods because of its isolation and
absence of adequate agricultural land. The reasons why Falmouth raised sheep for both
mutton and wool, while Nantucket raised sheep only for wool are unclear from the
surviving evidence, but it is very probable that the reasons have to do with location and
environment. Nantucket had a deficit of good agricultural land but had good harbors and
was sited well for both trade and whaling. It made more sense for Nantucket to
concentrate its limited agricultural resources on wool production. Income from the sale of
wool could then be used to purchase agricultural goods which were difficult to raise on
Nantucket. Conversely, it made more sense in Falmouth to concentrate efforts on
agricultural products which could be easily grown or raised and sent to the ready market
of Nantucket. This demand from Nantucket, driven by an explosion in population from
the growing whaling industry and increased trade, stimulated an explosion in the carrying
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trade in Falmouth, which can be seen in the increase in the number of sloops, or packet
ships, between 1698 and 1714. In 1698 there were four sloops operating in the area,
whereas by 1714 there were thirty vessels. This market swelled by the mid-1700s for a
number of reasons. The first is that the Cape’s position between the timber and fishing
grounds of coastal Maine and the wealthy markets to the south, like Providence and New
York, made it, and especially Nantucket, a hub of trade. This increase in wealth
stimulated both Nantucket’s growth and demand for the kind of agricultural goods that
places like Falmouth were already providing.29 Second, all over the Cape, fishing and
offshore whaling were becoming major economic activities. The largest and best sited
port for both those activities was Nantucket. Again this swelled Nantucket’s growth to
the point where it, and not Boston, was the regional hub of trade for the southern shore of
the Cape by 1760. Nantucket’s continued growth as a trade hub and especially as a center
of whaling continued until the town’s decline in the 1840s.30
Falmouth responded to the state of the regional economy by the late 1700s, when
the farmers of Falmouth and West Falmouth diversified themselves. They built boats and
ships to fish and to hunt whale, but most importantly, to trade. Coastal packet ships out
of West Falmouth and Falmouth brought farm products to markets as far away as Boston
and New York, but their main market was the island of Nantucket.31 As the whaling
industry grew, Nantucket grew. Nantucket’s growing population became ever hungrier
for meat, and West Falmouth farmers, who had plenty, were only too happy to comply.32
This stimulated not only the growth of sheep herds for meat, but also the number of cattle
and pigs. Throughout the periods covered by the Giffords’ minute books, sales of meat
such as mutton, beef, and pork both to Nantucket and to locals made up a substantial
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portion of their income.33 The Gifford brothers recorded numerous sales directly to
Nantucket butchers or to either packet captains or to local stores with Nantucket
connections.
Three examples drawn from the minute books should illustrate this diverse system
of supplying meat to Nantucket. The first and most obvious is the sale of livestock to a
butcher on Nantucket. The entry for September 23, 1830 describes the sale of eight bulls,
six lambs, two sheep and five calves to Dunnum the Butcher of Nantucket for a grand
total of $41.58.34 The means of transfer was one of the packets that plied the waters
between West Falmouth and Nantucket. Unfortunately, the account book of Captain
Hamblin, who transported the animals in his ship, no longer exists to show how he and
his packet profitted from this particular exchange, but based on the account books of both
Charles Lewis and Shubael Nye, it is most likely he charged a carrying fee, probably
amounting to less than a dollar.35 Another entry in Prince and Maltiah Gifford’s 18341836 minute book reinforces this possibility, as it records the brothers paying Captain
Eziekial Swift 75 cents to transport calves to New Bedford.36 Sometimes captains of
packet ships would purchase meat from the Giffords for resale in Nantucket. A captain
such as Joseph Swift, who had shares in three sloops and a brig, and who purchased 175
pounds of beef in 1835 for $8.31, is probably a good example. While the Giffords did not
record the final destination of the beef, a comparison between Swift’s other purchases
over time and the account books of both Charles Lewis and Shubael Nye indicate that the
purchase was probably bound for Nantucket with other goods.37
Lastly, stores with Nantucket connections often purchased meat for resale in
Nantucket or for outfitting whaling ships out of Nantucket. The best example would be
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the Swift brothers, Daniel and Seth, who ran both the local blacksmith shop and a store
that specialized in the products of the coastal trade carried on with Nantucket and
Kennebec, Maine. They also built ships and ran a chandlery and a salt shop that enabled
fisherman to preserve fish (Smith 1985:434). They were very busy men, and they made
numerous purchases of meat. For example, on 1 September 1836, the brothers Swift
bought fourteen and three-quarters pounds of mutton, fifteen pounds of veal as well as
one forequarter and one hind quarter of veal for $3.30 from the brothers Gifford.38 Due to
their Nantucket connections and the needs of the population there for meat, the Swifts
often purchased meats in bulk for resale to Nantucket rather than for personal use.
Other Economic Activities
Raising sheep for either wool or meat did not happen in a vacuum, however.
Farmers like the Giffords had other means of income. Some bought shares in the
Falmouth bank which opened in 1821, while others like the Giffords bought shares in or
worked on salt works.39 The Gifford minute books frequently mention either having to
work on the salt works or sending for wood to repair the salt works.40 This business was
a constant concern of Prince and Maltiah from their youth in the late 1700s, when the
Massachusetts General Court, with the encouragement of the Continental Congress,
offered a bounty of three shillings for every bushel of merchandisable salt in 1776. The
local farmers quickly came up with a very efficient, wind-powered way to extract salt
from the surrounding seas, and by the early 1800s, Falmouth’s shoreline was covered in
salt works. The addition of a ten-cent duty on imported salt only served to make saltmaking one of the most profitable enterprises that farmers like the Giffords could embark
upon. Between the Revolution and 1812, the price for a bushel of salt rose from fifty
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cents a bushel to seven dollars a bushel (Smith 1985:66). While the Giffords do not
record the income made from their share in the salt works in their minute books, it must
be assumed that they made a substantial amount of money from this venture. The minute
books do record their debts incurred in keeping the salt works going, in the form of
repairs and general labor.41 Oral histories, such as that of John Dillingham in 1909, are
insistent that the farmers of West Falmouth often ignored all other pursuits in order to
tend to the salt works, even when competition from other sources had brought the price of
a bushel down to $1.00 by 1829 (Smith 1985:66). Another source of income and profit
recorded in the minute books was the cutting and sale of cord wood. Much of this was
sold locally to those without woodlots, but a good portion was also sold to Nantucket, as
recorded in 1777 in Shubael Nye’s account book.42 Economically, raising sheep and the
carding and fulling mills that were interlocked with that industry were part of a much
larger local and more diverse economy.
The growth in Nantucket and its corresponding need for agricultural goods
contributed to Falmouth’s growth. The economic acceleration in both the commercial
agriculture and the regional economy led to the development of Falmouth as a central
village (Wood 1997:110-112). Centered on the meeting house and its accompanying
common, laid out in 1749, a linear village developed during the Federal period.43
Clustered along this line running to the east were both the residential buildings of the
more well-to-do as well as commercial buildings such as the Bank of Falmouth and the
doctor’s office, the blacksmith shop, and a tailor’s shop. Both the bank and the doctor’s
office overlooked the green itself.
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The early settlers of Falmouth created a landscape from the interaction of their
cultural expectations with their new physical environment. The development of both the
regional and local economies altered that interaction to create a functional, rather than a
utopian, landscape that served their growing economic needs. The development of the
town parallels the pattern proposed by Joseph Wood. The expansion of Falmouth’s initial
settlement was prompted by the desire for more pasturage. Joseph Wood challenges the
theory that the Puritan settlers of New England ordered their landscape in the 1600s
according to Puritan ideology, with its implicit desire to form a covenanted community,
or even according to defensive considerations. Instead, he posits that “distribution of
grasslands influenced how English settlers intent on family farming constructed their
settlement geography, its orientation, its extent, and its forms” (1997:23). In other words,
because cattle and other domesticated animals like sheep were so central to the mixed
agriculture practiced by the early Puritan settlers, those settlers arranged where they lived
according to the location of food sources for their animals. Instead of compact
communities, which were in fact the Puritan ideal, New England towns were made up of
dispersed farms and houses, what he refers to as dispersed places, nominally connected
by centrally located meeting houses which acted as a political and religious focus for the
towns (Wood 1997:20-33, 91-95), but not economic centers.
The creation and purpose of these auxiliary center places were for social, political,
and religious activities, but not economic ones because the economy was decentralized.
Falmouth followed this pattern predicted by Wood as well. In Falmouth, there was no
centralized placed for trade. Wood states that “the political purpose of the town, if not the
town itself, evolved out of the economic, the system of land distribution” (Wood 1997:
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39). This desire to control the distribution of land led the earliest form of town
government and of town record keeping in Falmouth. Wood suggests that “By controlling
the division of land, the proprietorship initially asserted political authority over
community organization and saw to it that a church was established and land provided for
its maintenance” (1997:39). In addition, Falmouth established an ordinary and a meeting
house, furthering its political and economic development. While factories did not appear
in Falmouth until the end of the Federal period (1790-1830), in most other respects the
pattern laid out by Wood holds true, especially in the development of its commercial
agriculture and other industries generated by a developing regional economy and changes
in the pattern of land ownership. Like many New England towns, by 1830 Falmouth was
using its prosperity to rewrite itself into the romantic ideal in which an imagined Puritan
past, complete with centralized utopian villages, was used to justify the past and mold the
future (Wood 1997:136-142). But this prosperity, while it succeeded in implanting its
ideal on the imaginary landscape of the past, failed by 1840.
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CHAPTER 3
DECADE OF CRISIS

The decade that spanned from 1830 to 1840 was a pivotal one not only for sheep,
but also for the local economy of Falmouth. The state valuation of 1831 confirms that the
town had prospered from the patterns of growth discussed earlier. There were 2973
sheep, more sheep than in any other Cape town, and the town’s stores and other
businesses collectively had $69,297 in goods used for carrying on their businesses, also
known as stock-in-trade. There were three carding mills and two fulling mills. The town
had also recently acquired a factory. The assessors had every reason to be pleased about
the state of the town.44 The state valuation of 1840 reveals a different picture. The
town’s sheep herds, which the MHCRSTR referred to as “central to the theme of
agriculture” (1985:10), now numbered only 1338 beasts, while the value of the stock-intrade of the town’s stores and businesses equaled only $28,812. There were at that point
two woolen factories operating in Falmouth, but all of the carding mills and fulling mills
were gone45 since the woolen factories had taken over those operations as part of the
process of making cloth. What happened?
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Overview of Economic Activity: 1830-1840
This decade of crisis can be examined using both the minute books of the Giffords
in conjunction with the state valuations, town assessments, and the Moonakis Factory’s
time book. The sheep industry and its relationship to the woolen mills and the landscape
is the main focus of this study, but neither the sheep nor the factories can be examined in
isolation. The raising of sheep has to be placed in the context of the complexity of the
local agriculture. Profit or lack of profit in one area of production affected other areas as
well. Also the sheep and the factories need to be placed into the context of their local
economy in the 1830s, as this local economy would have dominated decisions made
about production in both industries. Consequently, while examining the interrelationships
between all the areas of farm production, it is important to compare the sales of the sheep
raising portion of the Giffords’ farm to other areas of farm production. The events of the
local economy for this decade will be examined and then compared to both the Gifford
farm’s minute books and the factory data from the Moonakis Factory time book in order
to lay the ground work for an assessment of what effect (if any) these events had on
either one.
Falmouth Farmers and Their Practices
To understand how the local farmers worked, it is essential to examine the
background of Prince and Maltiah Gifford and scrutinize how they dealt with their sheep.
It must be understood that for these farmers, sheep were very important. Their
importance can be seen from not only histories and MHCRSTR reports, but also from the
brothers’ own minute books.46 They took careful notes on the numbers of sheep, as well
as when they needed to be put out and brought in. Even after the sheep became less
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profitable, the Giffords still kept track of the times they sheared and washed the animals
and sent them to the sheep yard.47 For Prince and Maltiah Gifford, like everyone else, the
decade started out well. According to the State Valuation of 1831, together they owned
seventy sheep, split evenly between the two brothers.48 Their farm in West Falmouth was
large, and they had the second largest sheep farm in West Falmouth. While seventy sheep
might not seem like a large number, many farmers kept smaller herds which sufficed to
meet their home manufacturing needs. The typical herd was between thirty and one
hundred sheep.
In dealing with their herd, they followed the same pattern year after year. In May
or June, the winter coat accumulated by the sheep was shorn, either by the Giffords
themselves or by someone hired to do it for them. For example, on the 8th of June in
1836, they hired a man to shear their sheep for eighty-three cents. With that done, they
turned over control of their sheep to the town shepherd, but they kept some at home and a
few on their land at Shapquit. The Giffords record in 1836 putting the sheep out to the
sheep yards on June 13th, but in other years, “turning out the sheep to the woods,” as
Prince was wont to say, would happen in late May.49 The town shepherd (one of the
seven hired by the town) then took the Giffords’ sheep along with everyone else’s from
the area and roved them all through the hills of West Falmouth and sometimes into the
town itself in search of pasture. The sheep roamed somewhat freely and were likely to be
found anywhere at any given time, even on the town green (Gaines 2007). This made
them unpopular with some people in the town who, beginning in 1808, repeatedly put
warrants before the town meeting demanding that the sheep be fenced in by their owners
and restricted to their owners’ properties. It is a measure of both the popularity of the
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sheep as well as the power of their owners that these warrants always died in Falmouth’s
town meeting. It also helped that at various times throughout this period, the Giffords and
the Bowermans served as both town selectmen and moderators of town meeting.50
The sheep were allowed to roam until early November, when the Giffords would
hire one of their younger relatives to go to the sheep yard by Long Pond, separate out
their sheep, and bring them home.51 Once they had them back near their barn, they began
feeding the sheep winter fodder, both English hay from their meadows and salt hay from
their marshes; then they would also cull the herd. Between November and February,
sheep would be selected out and butchered for mutton, which was quite popular in the
area to judge by the number of sales recorded in the minute books.52 Once March rolled
around, mutton production ceased, and the sheep were fed fodder until their annual spring
shearing, and then it was back out to the sheep yard.53
Data from the Minute Books
While the sheep were obviously important to the Giffords, they were not the only
concern on their farm. These farms had diverse production strategies, of which sheep
were a part. The minute books help piece together the relationship of sheep raising to
other forms of production. Dividing the surviving data from the 1830s from the minute
books into four two- year periods allows for an examination of changes over time. A twoyear interval was selected here to allow for the gaps in years in the minute books.
Because there are missing years, the figures here are incomplete, but the two-year span
gives a picture of average sales made by the Giffords in order to show the rise and fall of
their production and sales. In addition, the two-year span provides a better understanding
of the kinds of sales achieved by the Giffords than does a single year alone. Of the four
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categories compared, two listed are products of sheep: wool and mutton. The other two
categories are beef and wood, which made up a large portion of the profits recorded in
the minute books. Also noted are pounds sold or in the case of wood, cords and feet sold.
The minute books only record amounts sold and for what price and to whom, but they do
not record costs associated with the running of their farm, so the sale totals do not reflect
their net profits. The following tables give an overview of the amounts sold and the total
sales of the Giffords’ farm from 1829-1840.
Table 1. Sales of the Giffords’ Farm from 1829 to 1840

Wool

1829+1830
$27.43

1834+1835
0

1837+1838
0

1839+1840
0

Mutton

$7.11

$10.07

$7.72

$8.97

Beef

$95.68

$111.28

$50.58

0

Wood

$117.05

$197.21

$240.70

$131.67

Table 2. Amounts Sold by Giffords from 1829-1840

Wool

1829+1830
71 lbs.

1834+1835
0 lbs.

1837+1838
0 lbs.

1839+1840
0 lbs.

Mutton

174 lbs.

245 lbs.

121 lbs.

132 lbs.

Beef

1929 lbs.

1711 lbs.

317 lbs.

0 lbs.

Wood

30 cords; 21 ft.

36 cords; 25 ft.

39 cords; 36 ft.

19 cords; 35 ft.

The first period, from 1829-1830, was a lucrative one for the Giffords, for they
continued a pattern of selling wool and mutton locally. The amounts sold are comparable
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to the amounts recorded for wool and mutton sales in Maltiah Gifford’s minute book for
the earlier periods of 1805-1817. Adding together the sales for both wool and mutton, it
is not an insignificant amount, until it is compared to the money they made from beef and
wood sales. In 1829 and 1830, the Giffords sold nearly 2000 pounds of beef, while they
only sold 174 pounds of mutton. They made approximately $89 more from their beef
sales than they did from their mutton sales. In addition they also earned $117.05 from the
sale of cord wood. Adding these sales to the other items sold by the Giffords, items such
as pigs, hay, and apples, yields a grand total of $512.52 for the period.54 In this period,
they earned nearly half their money from the sale of beef and wood.
In the next period, 1834 and 1835, there was a small drop in total sales, probably
as a result of having no wool sales, the pattern that would remain for the rest of the
decade. On the other hand, mutton sales actually increased in this period. Beef and wood
sales also saw an increase in this time period. They sold fewer pounds of beef but made
more money because the price per pound increased. The big ticket item for 1834-1835
was wood. They increased wood production and made over $80 more in this period than
in the two-year period before it. Adding these items to the other products sold on the
farm, the overall income for 1834-1835 came to $499.81.55 The loss of wool sales
accounted for the minuscule drop in income, and overall both periods are reasonably
close.
Things began to change for the worse in the next two periods for the Giffords.
The third period covers 1837 and 1838. As during 1834 and 1835, the Giffords sold no
wool but continued to sell mutton. The price of mutton, which had remained fairly stable
at four cents a pound, began to fluctuate wildly between four and a half and seven and a
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half cents per pound after 1837, which accounts for the relatively high dollar amount
recorded in this two-year period, despite the drop in amount of mutton sold by 124
pounds. The 1837 and 1838 period saw a sharp drop-off in beef sales that would continue
into the next period and beyond, for the Giffords earned only half of what they had made
in the previous period. It is possible that this decline in beef sales is related to a rapid
decline in the state of the economy. The disastrous state of affairs was reflected in the
State Valuation of 1840 and might have had its origin in the period 1837-1838. The only
exception to this decline in sales for the Giffords is in the sale of cordwood. In this twoyear period, the brothers sold more wood and made more money than they had before.
Eight out of fourteen purchases of cord wood for the period were by a man named
Richard Wood, on behalf of some third party. Richard Wood is named as a captain of a
packet vessel by a minute book of the late 1840s, so it is very possible that many of these
purchases went to Nantucket as well as to locals. It is also possible that the Giffords
engaged in this increase in woodcutting to offset the losses they were experiencing in
wool, mutton, and beef, as well as in other area such as pork and grain production. They
also expanded their hay operations, both in English hay and in salt hay, but to no avail.
The overall income for 1837 and 1838, despite the expanded woodcutting and hay
production, was $330.02,56 down almost two hundred dollars since the first period of
1829-1830.
The last period, 1839 and 1840, was by far the worst one for Prince and Maltiah.
They sold no wool, and while mutton sales expanded, even this slight expansion in
mutton production could not offset the collapse of beef production. In this two year
period, no beef was sold at all. Prince and Maltiah had cattle, but they just were not
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selling any beef and only managed to sell one cow and two calves as livestock.57 When
examined in conjunction with the state valuation of 1840, which shows the stock in trade
for the town at $28,812 (much reduced from its 1831 high of $69,297), the data suggest
that poor beef sales reflect the state of the poor local economy.58
Wood production was also down in this period. The brothers managed to sell only
about half of the amount they had sold in the previous period. It is very likely that this
drop in productivity was a result of overcutting during the 1837 and 1838 period, for the
price of wood per cord had risen from $4.50 during the 1829-30 period to $5.50 after
1837.59 While it is possible that both Giffords were ill in this period, no surviving
evidence indicates that, nor does any surviving evidence indicate that there was a decline
in their ability to hire additional laborers. If the Giffords actually had possessed the extra
wood, they would have made a substantial profit by selling it. It is more likely that they
no longer possessed enough trees to take advantage of the increased prices. In addition,
the losses experienced in the other areas of farm production, such as pigs and grains,
were further exacerbated by a sharp decline in hay production. This across-the-board
decline in productivity or at least in sales is reflected in the rather dismal returns of the
1839 and1840 period, with a total income from these commodities only $255.63.60
Based on the data from the minute books, it is clear that the economic fortunes of
the Giffords paralleled that of the town. Both started the decade in prosperity and both
ended the decade in severe decline. This suggests a relationship that may be reflected in
the decline of the Giffords’ beef production in the period of 1837 and 1838. It seems that
the economic conditions of the town, and its corollary, demand for production, affected
operations on the farm both in terms of choosing what was sold as well as where the
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Giffords’ efforts were directed in production. The overcutting of wood as well as the
expanded hay production in the 1837 and 1838 period seems to have been a
compensation for the decline in production in beef, pigs, and wool.
The number of sheep also began to decline in this period. One reason for the
decline could be that as demand for agricultural goods fell as a result of the economic
downturn, the Giffords were forced to shift their efforts and time away from the less
productive sheep herding and towards woodcutting and haymaking. Reducing the
number of sheep was a strategy that was adopted as a result of a lack of wool sales. They
were not making any money from wool sales because the factories out-competed home
manufacture, the long standing source of demand for wool. When faced with the
economic crisis, the brothers shifted to more productive forms of agriculture. This point
will be further examined in Chapter 5. It is instructive to examine the actual numbers of
sheep owned by Prince and Maltiah Gifford, as well as other prominent sheep farmers in
Falmouth during this decade and compare these numbers to the economic data.
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Data from the State Valuations
Table 3. A Sampling of the Changing Herd Sizes for Falmouth Farmers
Dan
Bowerman
Prince and
Maltiah
Gifford
Elijah
Swift
Nathaniel
Lewis
Ward M.
Parker
Shubael
Lawrence
William
Nye
John and
Henry
Robinson

100

100

100

100

70

43

44

70

70

71

71

49

36

31

50

50

70

0

0

0

0

100

100

100

80

50

0

0

70

75

75

75

40

30

0

39

40

40

40

20

20

10

15

12

17

7

10

0

12

20

25

0

0

0

0

0

1831

1832

1835

1836

1837

1838

1840

This examination will focus will be on the number of sheep owned by the
Giffords between the years of 1831 and 1840. The data come from the state valuations of
1831 and 1840, as well as from the assessments or state bills for 1832, 1835, 1836, 1837,
and 1838. Both kinds of documents recorded what each inhabitant of the town owned in a
given year. The only difference between them is that the state valuations have an
aggregate at the back. In addition to the number of sheep owned by the Giffords in a
given year during this decade, the number of sheep owned by other sheep farmers will be
examined in order to place the Giffords’ data into the context of the town as a whole. The
six sheep farmers listed above were typical of the residents who owned sheep in
Falmouth.
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In 1831 the herds in town were owned by a variety of people and many of the
farms were prosperous. The two top sheep farmers in Falmouth in 1831 were Daniel
Bowerman and Nathaniel Lewis. In the middle range of sheep farmers were men like
Elijah Swift and Shubael Lawrence. At the bottom of the scale were farmers like John
and Henry Robinson.61 It is important to know that many of these farmers, like the
Giffords, practiced a form of mixed economy, finding revenue in a variety of crops, work
in the salt works, investments in trade, and animal husbandry. For example, Shubael
Lawrence was also president of the Falmouth Bank and the owner of a fulling mill and a
carding mill, among many other things. Elijah Swift had shares in whaling vessels and
packet ships, and he ran both a construction business and salt works, while John and
Henry Robinson operated first the Pacific Woolen Mill and then went on to found their
own, which would eventually become the Moonakis Woolen Factory.62 According to the
1832 assessment, the size of the sheep herds in Falmouth remained much the same as
they had been the year before, with just a few increases. Ward Parker displaced the
Giffords in the number three position.63
The year 1835 continued the trend of increases and stability in the herds, the one
exception being the herds of John and Henry Robinson, who no longer had any sheep at
all. For the rest of the decade, the Robinsons concentrated on their mill and the wharf and
boats in which they had shares.64 By 1836, however, a rapid decline in sheep began for
some of the few farmers. The records reveal that the Giffords were still maintaining their
herd. Also maintaining the status quo in numbers of sheep were Daniel Bowerman, Ward
M. Parker and Shubael Lawrence. The surprise is Elijah Swift, whose herd dropped to
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zero in 1836. He never owned sheep again, and instead concentrated on his salt works,
his ships, and his construction business.65
A marked decline began in 1836 and continued into 1837. The Giffords herd
dropped nearly a third, while Daniel Bowerman’s herd dropped by nearly a quarter. If
1837 saw a precipitous decline in the sheep population, the 1838 assessment reports a
disastrous one. Nathaniel Lewis abandoned sheep herding altogether by 1838. Ward M.
Parker’s and Shubael Lawrence’s herds had dropped by more than half by 1836. Despite
his slight comeback in 1837, William Nye lost his entire herd in 1838.66 In the following
year, the State Valuation of 1840 paints not only a grim picture of Falmouth’s economy,
but also one of decimated sheep herds.
Comparing the sheepherders side-by-side, both internally and with the economic
data from the minute books, a pattern emerges. From 1831-1835, it is plain the number of
sheep is maintained or in some cases increased. The exceptions to the trend in this time
period were John and Henry Robinson. Their abandonment of sheep may be tied to the
decline in the number of workers recorded in their time book for 1835, though it is
unclear how.67 William Nye just may have been an erratic farmer, but even his herd
increased slightly by 1835. In comparing the data from the Giffords’ minute books to the
number of sheep recorded in the state valuations and assessments, it appears that an
upward trend in the numbers of sheep owned happened while wool sales declined. For
the 1834-1835 period in Prince Gifford’s 1834-1836 minute book, no wool sales were
recorded and yet the Giffords and a lot of other farmers were still increasing their herds,
the extreme case being Elijah Swift, who added twenty sheep in the space of a year.68
This increase in herds could be a result of the demand for mutton, but according to the
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Gifford minute books, the demand for mutton was steady throughout the decade,
although the sheep herds declined.69 It seems almost like there was a disconnect between
declining wool sales and stable mutton sales on one hand and increasing number of sheep
on the other.
From 1836 to 1840, the general pattern in the sheep population was one of severe
decline. It seems as if the sheep farmers were cutting back their herds or, more often than
not, getting rid of them altogether, the exception being William Nye who added sheep to
his herd after his initial drop in 1836. Everyone else seems to have shared the more
common experience of decline. When these data are compared to those from the periods
of 1837-1838 and 1839-1840 in Prince Gifford’s 1837-1848 minute book, it is apparent
that the decline in sheep occurred at the same time as the Giffords (and probably most of
the other farmers) experienced a fall-off in both demand for agricultural goods and their
accompanying income.70
For the Giffords, the period of 1837 and 1838 saw the most precipitous decline in
their sheep herd, coupled with a decline in beef sales and a parallel increase in both
wood-cutting and hay production. Their income dropped to $330.02 in 1837-1838 from
the $499.81 that they had earned during the 1834-35 period. The period of 1839-1840
saw the Giffords’ income drop even further to $255.63.While their sheep herd only lost 5
sheep in this period, their production in beef dropped, as did their pork production and a
number of other traditional money makers.71
These declines in production, especially beef, it can be argued, reflect a decline in
demand. Sheep are the exception here. Their numbers decreased in these two periods, just
as they had increased during the 1834-1835 period, despite the lack of wool sales.
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Perhaps the decline in sheep was tied to the decline in the local economy and was a
casualty of belt-tightening and a shifting of priorities to deal with a worsening market.
This possibility will be discussed more in Chapter Five. It can be seen from the
examination of the Gifford minute books, the state valuations, and the town assessments
that this decade saw an increase in the sheep herds until 1836, after which a rapid decline
occurred, which reduced the overall population of sheep in Falmouth by two-thirds72
(roughly the same decline in the stock-in-trade valuation).
Data from the Moonakis Factory Time Book
The traditional explanation stresses the connection between the sheep industry
and the woolen factories in New England, and so it is necessary to examine the expansion
of the wool industry in Falmouth, along with the corresponding decline in both fulling
mills and carding mills, using the state valuations and town assessments as well as the
Moonakis Factory time book. These data can be compared to both the farm production,
according to the Gifford minute books, and the rise and fall of the sheep population, as
described in the assessments and state valuations.
As stated earlier, the home production of woolen cloth expanded in the 1700s as
did the demand for improved cloth produced by fulling mills. Shubael Lawrence took
advantage of the demand for this improved cloth by setting up a fulling mill in Falmouth
in 1788, as well as the first carding mill in 1811. By 1831, according to the state
valuation, the town of Falmouth had two fulling mills and three carding mills, all of
which had formed the basis of a brisk trade carried on by the local households, who made
homemade woolen goods. People brought the raw wool to the carding machine, had it
carded for a small fee, then brought it home and wove it into cloth. They brought the
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cloth to the fulling mill and for another small fee (one yard out of ten for the miller or a
cash payment) had it felted to improve the cloth. They could take the cloth home and
make clothes that they would then sell to places like Nantucket, Boston, or New Bedford,
and while they were at it, they would make their own clothes.73
Sometime between 1828 and 1831, after Congress had passed what would be
known in the south as the Tariff of Abominations (which placed taxes on imported goods
including woolen goods), Alexander Clark came to Falmouth. He set up what would
become the Pacific Woolen Factory.74 No records survive explaining this choice of a
name, but it is clear that the goods from this factory were sold in New England, not in the
West. Alexander Clark had come from Nantucket, and after receiving backing from the
Baker and Goddard Company of New Bedford, began construction of a mill along the
Coonamessett River, known then as the Five Mile River or Dexter’s River.75 He recruited
a number of locals to either help manage the factory or provide further backing, including
Reuben Dillingham, Stephen Dillingham (through his company Dillingham and Boyce),
Abner Hinckley, and John and Henry Robinson. Each of these men owned wharves and
shares in packet ships, and this may be why they were recruited by Clark.76 By 1831 the
factory was up and running, as indicated by the State Valuation of 1831, which lists one
factory in town owned by the above people. Unfortunately, this partnership was not
destined to last. For reasons that are not recorded, John and Henry Robinson pulled out of
the Pacific Woolen Factory sometime in 1831, and with the backing of Abner Hinckley,
started their own woolen mill on the Moonakis River which they named the Lewisville
Woolen Manufactory, later renamed the Moonakis Woolen Factory. According to the
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Moonakis time book, these mills opened for business by 1832. Employing 10 people,
they began producing cloth by September.77
Both the Lewisville Manufactory and the Pacific Woolen Factory followed the
model of what Gail Fowler Mohanty describes as Rhode Island-style mills, which were
small mill operations different from the larger Waltham-style mills, of which Lowell is
the best example. The Rhode-Island-style mills were controlled locally, with one owner
or a small partnership as opposed to corporate shareholders (Mohanty 1989:193). Each
mill at this point was partnered with locals who had shops (which were probably used for
selling woolen goods), ships (which more than likely carried finished goods to Nantucket
and perhaps brought raw wool to Falmouth), and wharves (likely where the ships
carrying the mills’ products could land).
By 1833 the presence of two woolen mills had a most deleterious effect on the
carding and fulling mills. Only one carding mill and one fulling mill were still left, both
owned by Shubael Lawrence. The rest had gone out of business.78 This collapse of the
fulling and carding mills was a result of the collapse in demand for their services because
of the ready-made cloth from the two woolen mills. Their rapid disappearance reflects the
decline of home manufacture of woolen goods for sale by local farmers. It certainly is
true that by the 1834-1835 period in Prince Gifford’s minute books, no wool sales were
recorded at all. It is highly likely that there is a connection between the two, for the
Gifford minute books make it clear that local farmers were not selling their wool to the
factories. Before the two factories were set up in Falmouth, the Giffords sold reasonably
large amounts of wool, but once the factories began to sell improved cloth, the wool sales
ceased. This issue will be discussed in fuller detail in Chapters Five and Six.
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While no data exist for the operations of the Pacific Woolen Factory, the time
book for the other Falmouth factory, the Moonakis Factory, provides a wealth of details
about production in the period from 1832-1840. Three phases can be discerned. The first
is the period from 1832-1834The work force fluctuated between five and eleven
employees, but the average was about eight. Production in this time period was quite
good, with the output for 1833 totalling over 10,000 yards of cloth. On the other hand, the
entries for 1832 and 1834 are somewhat spotty, with pages missing. Based on the number
of employees retained, however, production must have been good for those years as
well.79
The next phase spans the period 1835-1838, and is marked by a decline both in
productivity and in employees. The nadir of this period is in 1835, when the factory
employed only three people and produced no cloth.80 The factory may have kept itself
afloat by employing the fulling and carding mill it possessed to process local wool for
those who still practiced the home manufacture of woolen cloth. It is around this time that
the Giffords recorded their last sales of wool, though not to any factory, and the three
sales came to only fifteen pounds.81 Production at the factory fluctuated in this period
after 1835 from 3400 yards in 1836 to 1400 in 1838. What remains constant is the low
number of employees, the average of which is three82
The last period is from 1839-1840, when the woolen factories began to recover
from the mid-decade slump. There are gaps in the production records for this time, but
what is left, coupled with the increase in the average number of employees from three to
six, indicates an upswing in production probably to about two thirds of the 1833 level of
production.83
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The pattern revealed in the time book is one of an initial burst of productivity
from 1832 to 1834, followed by a slump from 1835 to 1838 and finally by a recovery in
1839. When the data from the minute books are compared with the state valuations, town
assessments, and the time book, however, the data do not correlate. This lack of
correlation in the empirical data presents a challenge to the AGS model, for integral to
the AGS model is the supposed interdependence between the sheep farmers and the
factories, which according to this evidence did not exist in Falmouth. The minute books,
the valuations, and assessments show a pattern of economic and agricultural expansion
until 1836, followed by a rapid decline, while the pattern revealed by the factory time
book shows a meteoric expansion of production from 1832-1834, followed by a serious
slump between 1835 and 1838. The decade ends with a partial recovery for the factory
beginning in 1839.
By 1840, according to the state valuation, the Pacific Woolen Factory was doing
quite well for itself. It possessed a factory, two warehouses, and a shop. It even sported
two dwellings for its employees. About its nearby rival, the Moonakis Woolen Factory,
quite a bit more is known. John and Henry Lawrence, who by 1840 had become the sole
owners of the second woolen factory in Falmouth, finally settled on the Moonakis
Woolen Factory as a name for their company. The state valuation says that the Moonakis
Woolen Factory was in possession of one factory, one warehouse, and two stores. For
good measure, they also had a grist mill. Unlike many of the inhabitants of Falmouth farmers, store owners, and sheep - the Pacific Woolen Mill and the Moonakis Factory
seem to have not only survived but also flourished.
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The data reveal that the 1830s were a period of immense change for not only the
farmers of Falmouth but also for the entire population. While some relevant data are
missing, a comparison of the surviving data from the Giffords’ minute books, the state
valuations, the town assessments, and the town book of the Moonakis Factory allows a
picture of Falmouth in the 1830’s to be drawn. After 1836, the sheep herds, in
conjunction with other elements of Falmouth’s economy, went into a disastrous decline.
Beef production plummeted by the end of the decade, as did the town’s stock-in-trade. In
contrast, the data suggest that the two woolen factories in Falmouth had mid-decade
slumps, which they emerged from just as the rest of the town slipped into economic
crisis.
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CHAPTER 4
THE TRADITIONAL MODEL

The model put forth by the American Geographical Society (AGS) came to
dominate historical thought about the way New England agriculture collapsed in the
1840s. Sponsored by the AGS, prominent historians, geographers, and economists helped
construct a picture of New England, its agriculture, industry, and economy. In order to
understand the complexity of such a diverse system, the AGS maintained, many
disciplines would need to cooperate in order to create a clear picture of the challenges of
the region.
History of the AGS Model
The central assumption of the traditional model is the claim that New England’s
soil is rocky and infertile and often referred to by a variety of authors as hardscrabble.
Clearing ground filled with stone is labor-intensive and needs more equipment. Because
of this terrain and the difficulty in preparing it adequately for the demands of agriculture,
claims the traditional explanation, farmers in New England were limited in what
agricultural crops they could produce and by the high cost of production (Wright 1933:9).
The model suggests that once factories provided a ready market for wool, Eastern farmers
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increased production of wool by increasing their herds. Sheep were more cost effective
than other agricultural products. This increase in sheep-farming could last only as long as
the factory market was available and exclusive. New England agriculture had inherent
disadvantages. Once improved transportation allowed inexpensive agricultural goods
from the west to enter the New England market, New England farmers, especially sheep
farmers, could not compete. As a consequence, they abandoned sheep (Turner 1933:9;
Bell 1989:450-452).
This model has its origins in a paper written by James Walter Goldthwait, “A
Town That Has Gone Downhill” (1927). While making a topographic map for the
township of Lyme, New Hampshire, Goldthwait observed that the population had
dramatically decreased since the middle 1800’s. Goldthwait suggested in his paper that
one of the causes for the depopulation was that the local farms were not productive and
that they required a lot of work. In order to make his point, he specifically quoted from
The History and Description of New England: New Hampshire, observing that “the
principal occupation of the people is in subduing a hard, siliceous surface, and extorting
from its reluctant lap the bread of toil” (1927 :536). He concluded by noting that by 1840
the population of Lyme began to emigrate to the west in search of farmland that was
easier to work and more productive (1927:536).
Goldthwait’s inquiry into the depopulation in Lyme, NH inspired the American
Geographical Society to bring together a group of geographers, historians, economists,
and sociologists to study the population, region by region, of the United States. They
chose to study New England first because of the “highly critical state of its agriculture
and part of its industrial population. From the related subjects of economics and
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sociology contributions [would be] sought to make a well-rounded study of the history of
settlement with a view to furnishing an essential background for the conditions of [the
day]” (Wright 1929: 318). The earliest contributors included Louis Wolfanger, James
Truslow Adams, and Harold Wilson, who conducted their individual studies in the
1930’s. Wolfanger concentrated his studies on soil and economic geography. Adams’
specialty was history, and Wilson was an economic historian. In addition, historian
Frederick Jackson Turner examined the political influence of the New England region.
Together, these scholars provided information from different disciplines to the AGS to
create what the AGS believed was a complete picture of agriculture, industry, population,
and the economy in New England.
Although Goldthwait’s paper only dealt with New Hampshire and not New
England as a whole, nevertheless, it prompted the AGS to recognize that the declining
population and abandoned farms meant that something had fundamentally changed in
rural New England. Consequently, the AGS sponsored a program that sought to
understand the attenuated state of New England agriculture. This study, which occurred
between 1927 and 1950, closely examined the issues arising from the interaction of man
with the natural landscape, including such diverse elements as topography, rock structure,
soil, and climate.
In order to study such a complex system, the AGS decided it needed a number of
specialists to conduct inquiries, region by region, into the causes of the agricultural
systems having reached such a critical state. Each academic contributed papers to the
New England Studies Program, the umbrella group that gathered and compiled all the
information into what would become a coherent model that explained the collapse of
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New England agriculture. John K. Wright, a geographer and historian employed by the
AGS from 1920 to 1956 as a librarian, editor, academic contributor and eventual director,
claimed that the AGS viewed their undertaking as analogous to doctors seeking to cure a
very sick patient:
When competent modern physicians undertake to cure a complicated and difficult
case they first examine into all possible causes of disease and disability. . . .
Diagnosis that is both thorough and comprehensive is needed regarding the
maladjustments in the body politic of New England. The various separate factors
– geographical, economic, social, historical – that combine to frustrate the efforts
and hopes of large groups of people must be analyzed in detail (Wright 1929:
485).
It would take several years, decades even, to compile all the disparate information and
study the interrelationships. The information from different disciplines was shared among
the scholars, published in the Geographical Review, and became the basis for the AGS
model. The contributors published a series of papers which concluded that New England
soils were stony and infertile, and that hardscrabble, subsistence farming was the only
form of agriculture that could be practiced there. Later, analysts like Bell discussed the
same issues (Wright 1933:9; Bell 1989:450-452).
In 1933 the AGS published New England’s Prospect 1933, which was a
compilation of the research to date on the conditions in New England, what caused them,
and what could be done to improve the situation. This publication formed the backbone
of the model that explained the collapse of agriculture in New England. In the following
years, authors such as economist John D. Black and historian Harold Wilson continued to
expand upon this model. New England Prospect 1933 became a jumping-off point for a
much longer and complex series of articles that built upon the original model.
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Wolfanger, Adams, and Theories of Subsistence Farming
Louis Wolfanger concurred with Goldthwait’s opinions about New England
farming. Wolfanger claimed that New England farmers “were unable to wrest a
competitive living from soils that nature had unstintingly strewn with alien boulders and
almost exhausted long before his arrival” (1931:287-288). The influence of this
description in the AGS model can be seen in Petersham, Massachusetts in the series of
dioramas of the Harvard Forest. The dioramas show the step-by-step clearing, field
abandonment, and subsequent regrowth of the Harvard Forest in Petersham. Researcher
Richard T. Fisher created the dioramas during his tenure at the forest. Fisher believed that
New England’s continued growth in agriculture depended upon regenerating forests for
sustained timber yield. In “Another Look from Sanderson’s Farm” Brian Donahue
describes the production of the dioramas:
The dioramas were produced to show how careful management of regrown forest
stands could help New England produce high quality timber. The dioramas were
constructed during the 1930s and most of them were designed by Fisher himself
before his death in 1934 . . . They depict the death and rebirth of the Petersham
Forest [and] the rise and fall of New England farming . . . but around the rest of
the hall are more models, three quarters of the exhibit, that few but museum
visitors ever see. These dioramas display the vision of conservation that flowed
from an understanding of [history]” (Donahue 2007: 22).
The history these dioramas presented was drawn from the AGS model. Fisher’s
goal was to show that better management was needed to resurrect and sustain New
England agriculture. He felt that farmers should avoid the mistakes they had made in the
past. Fisher’s idea of using history to resurrect and create a sustainable model of New
England agriculture was very much in line with the purpose of the AGS. Fisher also
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implied through the dioramas that farming “on stony soils led to the early construction of
stone walls” because it was so difficult to move the stones far away from their farms.
The stone walls that dominate the dioramas (and New England as a whole) arise from the
act of clearing. They do not change as the dioramas proceed through time, implying that
the walls originated from a land so stony that it had to be cleared of rocks before farming
could begin (Bell 1989: 451-452).
The creation of stone walls as an element of small-scale farming, and thus
landscape evidence of the inferiority of New England agriculture, was only part of the
larger AGS model. The corollary to the idea of the infertility of the New England soils
was the inability of New England farmers to compete agriculturally with Western
farmers. Once western agricultural goods entered the New England markets via canals
and especially railroads, farms and most of their traditional products were rendered
unprofitable and thus abandoned. James Truslow Adams, in his contribution to New
England’s Prospect 1933 sums up the farmers’ challenges nicely:
Costs, topography, climate, and markets all favored the western farmer. The
western country, appearing to offer more profitable opportunities, attracted
capital, which, as well as labor, was lacking to the small farmer of New England.
At a critical period, the difficulties of large-scale production were insuperable for
Yankee agriculture (Adams 1933:9).

In other words, small-scale farming led to the rapid agricultural decline in the New
England region. With the introduction of cheaper agricultural goods from the west, New
England farmers began to abandon farming altogether when they realized that they could
not compete in the marketplace.
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The Implications for the Rural Economy
It is in this context of this AGS model that Harold Wilson (who contributed to the
original study) wrote “The Rise and Decline of the Sheep Industry in Northern New
England” (1935). Wilson, again using the AGS model of an infertile New England
environment, proposed that the expansion of the number of sheep in the early 1800s was
both a result of the agricultural limitations of an infertile landscape and, more
importantly, a response to the demands of an expanding woolen industry (Wilson
1935:13-21). Wilson proposed that sheep provided far greater profit in the past for the
labor involved than did raising corn or wheat, two popular crops at the time (Wilson
1935:13). This idea lead to the second and more important of Wilson’s reasons for the
expansion in the number of sheep in New England: by the 1820s and 1830s, factories of
all sizes were expanding production and increasing in numbers, mainly in southern New
England, but also in northern New England. These factories needed wool, and the farmers
of New England, according to Wilson, responded to that demand by ramping up raw
wool production through the increase of their sheep herds. In the process, the sheep
farmers and the factories formed a symbiotic relationship. As woolen factories increased
both in number and production, so the number of sheep also increased. Industry
stimulated the expansion of sheep in this period, Wilson argued (1933:13-18).
Wilson claimed also that this symbiotic relationship between sheep farmers and
wool factories ultimately led to the decline of sheep in this period (1933:17-25). If this
demand for New England wool was reduced or even removed, the sheep herds that were
sustained by it would disappear. This idea is the underlying concept of Wilson’s portion
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of the traditional model: in various forms, the demands of one sector of the New England
economy, such as wool factories, and the agricultural portions of the New England
economy, such as sheep farming, formed an interdependent relationship. Wilson’s idea
that sheep herds expanded to meet the growing demands of the factory and the population
it served is played out in other sectors of the agricultural economy as well, even though
this was not the case in Falmouth. Wilson suggested that in New England, factories
became a ready market for a product that the farmers found easy to raise with minimal
effort regardless of the quality of the soil. Like factories that created a ready market for
wool, the population increases in the cities and surrounding areas created a ready market
for milk, cheese, and butter, so New England farmers began to focus their efforts on these
profitable forms of agriculture. The idea that New England agriculture was an adjunct to
the expansion of industry and urban demands is the basis for the AGS’s explanation of
the collapse of the sheep industry in the 1840s (Baker and Izzard 1991:341).
Wilson suggested that because it was cheaper to produce wool in Ohio and other
western states in the 1820s, wool could be produced in far greater quantity there. As long
as there was no transportation to get the wool to markets in the east, however, this state of
affairs had no effect on New England sheep-raising. This situation began to change with
the construction of the Erie Canal in 1825. Wilson asserts that after 1825, cheaper
western goods slowly began to move into the eastern market. The Eric Canal, according
to Wilson, created a beachhead that was expanded upon by the creation of the
Pennsylvania canal system and the expansion of the railroads. At this point, New England
farmers’ products were still viable in the market because, although those modes of
transportation allowed western goods to enter the eastern markets, the transportation costs
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were still high enough to make eastern goods competitive (Turner 1931:158-159; Wilson
1933:19-20; Bell 1989:456-460).
These circumstances changed in the 1840s, according to Wilson, when the rail
line between Boston and Albany was completed; the completed line lowered the
transportation costs for goods from the west to the point at which eastern goods became
too costly. Transportation costs were lowered to a negligible level, and in the battle
between eastern and western wool, it all came down to production costs. Wilson claims
that the two dollars per year it cost in the east per head of sheep just couldn’t compete
with the twenty-five cents to one dollar per head per year it cost to raise sheep in Ohio;
thus, after 1845, the eastern farmers began to abandon sheep and other forms of
agriculture (Wilson 1933:20). As stated before, Wilson’s assumption that the eastern
farmers were unable to compete with the western farmers was grounded in the
environmental determinism espoused by the AGS.
In 1950 John D. Black used the AGS model to write The Rural Economy of New
England. In this regional study, Black presented as a regional study an analysis of New
England’s rural economy along with its industries and trade. His main purpose was to
present problems that needed to be addressed in order to revive New England’s economy.
Part of his basic analysis was that New England soils were rocky and infertile, and that
only with the administration of large doses of fertilizer would they be productive for the
New England farmer (Black 1950:181). He took as a starting point the infertility of New
England in building his model, but he did not spend a great deal of time supporting his
initial position. For him, the AGS suggestion that New England’s soil was infertile was
simply a commonly held truth. Writing nearly twenty years after the initial series of
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studies, Black took some of the model’s ideas as accepted historical fact. With Black, the
idea that New England soil is infertile and rocky moved from the realm of a geographical
study to that of common, accepted wisdom.
The model advanced by the AGS and authors like Wilson and Black for the
collapse of New England agriculture in general, and sheep in particular, with its basis in
environmental determinism, forms the cornerstone of a broader historical narrative, one
in which the hardscrabble environment which is supposedly the New England environs
forged a Yankee character based on self-reliance and moral certainty (Turner1931: 155156). This character was imprinted on much of the country through the emigration of
New England farmers forced to seek better. A couple of examples of New England’s
influence on the rest of the country as a result of this immigration should suffice (Turner
1931: 154, 156, 161).
The New England Diaspora
Frederick Jackson Turner utilized the AGS model and discussed the influence of
the New England diaspora in his 1931 paper, “New England 1830-1850.” Turner
suggested that New England gained power in the Union by the dissemination of her
economic and political influence and her intellectual ideals. For economic influence, he
cited such New England expatriates as J.P. Morgan and Jay Gould, who held
commanding positions in the U.S. economy. He cited numerous examples of political
influence in such diverse settings as Utah, which adapted the New England style town to
meet the needs of the Mormon theocracy. Incidentally, the founder of Mormonism Joseph
Smith came from Vermont (Turner 1931).
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Turner also referenced the Wisconsin Constitutional Convention of 1846, where
two-thirds of the representatives were New Englanders. The New Englanders, according
to Turner, carried many of their cultural ideas and their work ethic with them wherever
they went, and unlike southern settlers in the west, the transplanted New Englanders were
more likely to pay attention to and act upon even radical ideas that came out of New
England, like the Abolitionist Movement and Transcendentalism, so those movements
spread, particularly Abolitionism. The Puritan work ethic also helped generations of
Americans in the West to define themselves as no-nonsense, hardworking, God-fearing
people (Turner 1931).
This traditional AGS model still influences views of New England today, and it
forms the basis for a wide variety of theories that deal with the region. For example,
Andrew H. Baker and Holly B. Izzard argued in their 1991 paper “New England Farmers
and the Marketplace,” as did others before them, that “the New England environment was
full of rocky soil and rugged terrain more suited to raising livestock instead of cultivating
crops” (Baker and Izzard 1991:33). Like the AGS researchers, they conclude that “with
relatively inexpensive goods from more distant farmlands now available, it no longer
made economic sense for the region’s farmers to continue certain types of production”
(Baker and Izzard 1991: 43). According to Baker and Izzard (1991:43), one of those
types of production that was abandoned was wool production. Their conclusions are not
backed up with citations of any of the authors of the AGS study. Instead, their assertions
are presented as commonly known truths or they are based on authors who in turn derive
their citation from the AGS authors.
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Joseph Wood also discusses the spread of New England ideals when he describes
how the settlement ideal of a center village first conceived in New England in the early
1800s “endures in villages real and imagined across the United States, a settlement ideal
brought by immigrants from New England” (Wood 1997:157). The New England ideal of
a strong central village, forged by the hard work of the farmers whose land surrounds the
center of town, continued to be a staple of American culture as it moved west. Wood
builds on the AGS model and its theory that New England is hardscrabble and stony.. In
the opening chapters of his book, Wood describes the environment of most of New
England as “the less enticing sandy scrub and stony loam hardscrabble of the morainic
lowlands, which the rivers interpenetrated and deep forest covered. Receding glaciers
had distributed a heterogeneous, extremely stony glacial till across most of New
England” (Wood 1997: 27). The word choice in many cases resembles the word choices
from the AGS, yet like Baker and Izzard, the AGS is not cited. Again, the infertility of
the New England environment is either assumed as a fact or authors are cited who are
regurgitating the AGS model. The fact that all of these authors – Goldthwait, Black,
Wilson, Turner, and Wood - use the same terminology and the same theory spread over
such a long period is indicative of the power this model has had on the mindset of
historians.
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Theory
At its heart, the AGS model is a macro-economic theory generated from
environmental determinism. Because of these two components, the AGS model has the
shortcomings of both theories, as well as their explanatory strengths. Their explanatory
strengths have been examined by Wolfanger and others, and a quick examination of their
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shortcomings is in order. Macroeconomic theories assume uniformity across the region or
nation under study that is not always apparent in reality. This is not to say that
macroeconomic theory is always wrong, but it does tend to obscure, and at worse ignore,
the actions of individuals and local structures and their effect on events.
Macroeconomics often purports that the actions of individuals and localities are
determined by overarching economic factors, rather than claiming that those overarching
economic patterns are determined by the interactions of individuals and local economies
with others across a region or even the world. Theories employing macroeconomics tend
to utilize patterns which are expected to hold everywhere, a theoretical stance that
microhistorians such as Carlo Ginzberg (1991), warns, is not always supported by local
evidence. At its worst, macroeconomic theory oversimplifies instead of explains.
Environmental determinism assumes a uniform reaction to environmental stimuli.
In other words, a particular environment or landscape will produce similar cultures or
economic conditions. For example, Turner discussed the difficulties inherent in New
England’s hard rocky soil, and he suggested that it produced the thrifty, hard-working
Yankee work ethic that has become part of the character of the region. Looking more
closely at individual cases, however, one can see that similar environments do not always
produce similar cultures. The AGS model, however, uses an environmental determinism
model and assumes a uniformity of environment in New England, that all of New
England is rocky and hardscrabble, even if it that description is not borne out by the
evidence in Falmouth or many other locations in New England. A deeper analysis can
reveal flaws in the AGS model.
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To test the AGS model’s applicability to the local context, I compare it to the
pertinent evidence in Falmouth. According to the model, Falmouth’s soil should have
been relatively infertile, making it difficult to support anything other than crop
production. This state of affairs in turn should have forced the local farmers to
concentrate on the raising of sheep in order to supply the factories that emerged after the
War of 1812. This relationship between the farmers and factories of Falmouth, according
to the theory, should have remained profitable only as long as the farmers had no
competition from other parts of the country. Once cheap western wool began to enter the
Eastern markets, the AGS model suggests that Falmouth sheep-raising would decline
disastrously, for the local factories would buy western wool because of its competitive
price. The Falmouth wool, according to the theory, would have been more expensive
because of the less fertile environment. To meet the strictures of the AGS model as set
forth by Wolfanger and Adams, Falmouth should have had infertile soil. In addition,
Falmouth farmers should have had an exclusive relationship with the local factories,
supplying them with wool, if one follows Harold Wilson’s model.
Wilson’s form of the AGS model lays out what should be the timeline for the
collapse of the sheep industry in Falmouth, which can be summed up as follows. The
number of sheep in Falmouth’s herds should increase in number from 1830 until about
1845. After 1845, the number of sheep in the town should collapse precipitously.
According to Wilson, New England experienced a 63% decline in the number of sheep
between 1850 and 1860 (1935: 21). Falmouth should experience a similar decline. The
causes of this decline, according to the AGS model and Wilson, were the introduction of
wool from Ohio and other western states into the New England market (Turner 1931:15875

159). The timing of this decline in the AGS model is set by the completion of the Erie
Canal in 1825 and its expansion with the opening of the Ohio and Pennsylvania canal
systems between 1832 and 1834, coupled with the expansion of railroads, especially the
Boston to Albany line, in 1841. After 1841 the price of wool declined so much as a result
of the flood of cheap western wool that, according to the model, New England farmers
could no longer make a profit selling wool to the woolen factories, and thus abandoned
sheep farming altogether (Turner 1931:173; Wilson 1935:19-20). Raising sheep for profit
should have declined after the introduction of cheap wool from the west if Wilson and
Turner are to be believed. By examining the local evidence in Falmouth, the predictive
qualities of the AGS model can be tested.
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CHAPTER 5
COMPARISON OF LOCAL ARCHIVAL EVIDENCE TO THE TRADITIONAL
MODEL AND POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE DECLINE

An examination of the local evidence for Falmouth shows that the AGS model
does not adequately explain the collapse of the sheep industry. The three major points of
the model, the infertility of the soil, the supposedly close relationship between the woolen
factories and the sheep farmers, and the timing of the collapse (coinciding with the
introduction of cheap western wool), are not supported by the Falmouth evidence. The
AGS model will be compared to the local evidence on these three points. It may be that
the theory does apply to other towns in New England to varying degrees, but it does not
work for Falmouth. A tentative reconstruction of the causes of the collapse of the
Falmouth sheep industry based on a close reading of the local evidence will be presented
as an alternative to the AGS explanation.
Falmouth Soil and Cash Crop Production
According to the AGS model, the soil of Falmouth should be infertile to the
extent that most farmers there could only practice subsistence farming (Wright 1933:6-9).
While Falmouth does have areas where the ground is rocky, especially in West Falmouth,
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the soil is by no means infertile, for Falmouth successfully exported various crops over a
long period of time. The HARCCI claims that as early as the 1680’s Falmouth, along
with other towns on the south coast of the Cape, sent excess agricultural goods to
Nantucket. During the 1700’s, Falmouth became one of the chief agricultural suppliers
for Nantucket because of “Nantucket’s isolated location and absence of adequate
agricultural land.” 84 The productivity of Falmouth soils was to continue into the 1800’s.
During the period from 1829-1837, the Giffords sold rye and barley in bushels
and pecks as well as bushels of potatoes and barrels of apples to the local market.85 The
amount of grains and fruits produced for the local market was relatively small compared
to what they were producing in meat, wood, and wool, but it is important to remember
that their time, efforts, and lands were mainly dedicated at this point to raising livestock,
cutting wood, and tending their salt works. Those were the goods most in demand by
Nantucket, the primary market for goods from Falmouth. The fact that they were raising
barley, rye, potatoes and apples for sale, but with very little tending, is indicative of the
productivity of the soil of Falmouth as a whole, despite the fact that West Falmouth
mainly consists of moraines with a lot of rocks in the soil.
Despite the somewhat rocky soil, many local farms were quite productive. An
examination of both Prince Gifford’s 1837-1848 minute book as well as Arnold Gifford’s
surviving ledgers from 1837-1840 and 1844-1848, shows how productive the soil could
be when it received Prince and Maltiah Gifford’s undivided attention. After the sheep
herds collapsed, and along with it beef sales and wood sales, the Giffords redirected their
efforts to raising onions between 1837 and 1840. That the soil was still productive is
indicated by the amount of onions produced and shipped out in barrels. The Giffords
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could fill large and small orders. For instance, they sold four barrels of onions in
November of 1839 to Captain Joseph Swift and forty barrels of onions to Arnold Gifford,
who sold those barrels on their behalf to Captain Tobey of the Oneco for $37.71.86 The
ultimate destination for the onions is not noted in either of the minute books, except to
say that the onions were sold south, and this most likely indicated Nantucket, still the
major market for goods from Falmouth.87 The Giffords were not the only ones who raised
onions commercially in West Falmouth, according to John Hoag Dillingham, a local
historian born in West Falmouth in 1839. “After the salt had come down to near 25 cents
a bushel (a reference to the sale of salt from the salt works), the raising of
onions…became the leading industry” (Smith 1985: 434). The village as a whole was
raising onions as a cash crop.
Like farmers everywhere, farmers in Falmouth faced challenges from nature, but
the evidence reveals how well they coped with these challenges. After maggot worms got
into the onion fields and devastated the crop, the farmers of West Falmouth switched
over to French turnips, which were sold in Boston. With no more surviving minute books
from either Prince or Maltiah Gifford, the evidence comes from local historians such as
Virtue B. Gifford, who talked to these farmers when they were very old men and she was
a young woman interested in the history of her village.88 She noted that Falmouth farmers
first raised onions then French turnips, and this is in addition to the crops that they raised
to feed themselves. This evidence seems to suggest that the soil supported more than
subsistence farming in West Falmouth; in fact, Falmouth as a whole was less rocky than
West Falmouth, and even more productive. In the 1800’s, according to the HARCCI,
Falmouth had more productive farmland than any other town save Barnstable, and a
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greater percentage of farmers than any other town on the Cape again except Barnstable.89
The Cape as a whole made up more than 3% percent of the grain production in the state90
By the early 1900s, even small Falmouth farms were still productive. According
to The Book of Falmouth, Falmouth was noted as a producer of asparagus and zucchini,
as well as the ubiquitous stands of corn common to this area (Smith 1985:189, 245). One
such productive farm in the 1900s was Coonamessett Farm in Hatchville (a village of
Falmouth). In 1921 Coonamessett Farm grew eighty acres of rye, fifty acres of corn,
twenty acres of asparagus, fifteen acres of oats, ten acres of peas, four acres of grapes,
forty acres of buckwheat and twenty acres of millet (Smith 1985:248). Most of these
crops can find a parallel in the Giffords’ minute books, though in lesser amounts than that
grown at Coonamessett Farm. If farms like Coonamessett were still thriving in the early
twentieth century, it is reasonable to assume that they managed to survive the ups and
downs of the economy in the nineteenth century, thus indicating that the soil remained
productive in Falmouth.
One major difference between the kinds of cash crops grown in Falmouth in the
1800s and 1900’s was the introduction of the strawberry in 1895 by immigrants from the
Azores and the Cape Verde islands (Smith 1985:190-195). The strawberry quickly came
to be a dominant theme in Falmouth agriculture and by the 1930s, Falmouth had over 500
acres of strawberries planted alongside all of the other kinds of crops grown in large
farms like Coonamessett. At the height of demand in the mid-1930s, the sale of
strawberries brought in more than a quarter of a million dollars a year into the town
(Smith 1985:190-195).
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Based on all of this evidence, it is quite clear that the farmers of Falmouth had a
long history of producing cash crops for markets, whether local or regional, and that they
were not subsistence farmers, for the soils of Falmouth in fact could be quite productive.
This is not to say that the soils of Falmouth did not require fertilizer, but then again,
Western soils required that as well. The implications of these facts are that the farmers of
Falmouth could and did employ the land to raise cash crops and not just farm for
subsistence, and that they were not constrained in what they chose to produce. Certainly
AGS model terms like “hardscrabble” and “infertile” to not apply to Falmouth.
Farmers and Factories
Wilson and Turner claim that New England farmers were forced by the infertility
of the soils to concentrate on husbandry and that when woolen factories began to appear
after 1815, that animal husbandry took the form of sheep herding in order to satisfy the
growing demands of the factories for wool. An exclusive relationship developed between
the woolen factories and the sheep farmers. Because of the constraints of the
environment, the sheep farmers were more or less forced into this relationship with the
factories (Turner 1931:159-160; Wilson 1935:13). In the case of Falmouth, that does not
seem to apply at all, for its farmers had many options when it came to making a profit
from the land. They did not have to raise sheep for the factories in order to make money;
they could and did raise grains such as rye and corn as cash crops. While they did focus,
at least in West Falmouth, on sheep and cattle, it was not because the land restricted them
to those choices; instead, it was what the market demanded. They were never forced into
an exclusive relationship with the local factories because the land allowed them other
options. When cattle and sheep failed them in the 1830s, they were able to switch easily
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to onions and turnips in West Falmouth, and truck vegetables and grains in other parts of
Falmouth. Farming did ultimately fail in Falmouth, but not because the land was poor.
According to the AGS model, by the 1830s the sheep farmers and the woolen
factories existed in an exclusive and symbiotic relationship in which the demands of the
woolen mills drove the increase in the number of sheep owned by the farmers. These
farmers in turn sold to the only market available to them, the woolen mills (Turner
1931:159-160; Wilson 1935:13). As in the first example, the AGS model does not fit
Falmouth’s circumstances. It seems that sheepherders like the Giffords and others in
Falmouth had no relationship with either the Moonakis Woolen Factory or the Pacific
Mill Factory. Perhaps the reason lies in the fertility of the Falmouth soil, allowing the
farmers to enter into other ways of achieving profits from their farms. The evidence for
the nonexistence of a relationship between Falmouth’s sheepherders and Falmouth’s
woolen factories can be found in both the minute books of Prince and Maltiah Gifford as
well as the Moonakis time book. It can also be found in the reminiscences of Orrin C
Bourne, who worked in the Moonakis Factory, though at a later date.
The detailed entries in the Giffords’ minute books make it clear that they had
nothing to do with either the Moonakis Woolen Factory or the Pacific Woolen Factory.
The Giffords recorded no wool sales to either factory, nor are any sales of wool recorded
to their owners. Alexander Clark and Abner Hinckley make no appearance whatsoever in
the minute books, while Stephen Dillingham only appears when he bought meat.91 The
Robinsons appear in the minute books, but never to purchase wool. The Giffords do
record wool sales, quite a number of them before 1831. For example, “5th mo. 29th
1830--- Charles Bowerman to Prince Gifford Jr. and Maltiah Gifford Dr. (debtor) to 25 ¾
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lbs. sheep’s wool--- $ 8.49.”92 All of the other entries going as far back as 1807 read
much the same.93 The problem for the AGS model and Wilson is that none of these
meticulously recorded wool sales are to the local woolen factories or their owners. They
all seem to be to local people, both men and women94
What is missing in these minute books is an entry that is found in an account book
from an island not very far from Falmouth. The island of Naushon lies in the Elizabeth
Island chain, which is off the coast of Woods Hole. The island had been the exclusive
property of the Bowdoin family since 1730, and for most of that time, they ran it as a
large sheep farm (Emerson 1963:5). By 1819, there were 4000 sheep on the island.95
While the actual records of the island are in private hands, Amelia Forbes Emerson put
together excerpts of these records in An Anthology of Naushon 1833-1917. One of these
entries from 1863 states very clearly what the Gifford minute books do not, “Sold wool
from 1115 sheep, 2765 lbs, @ 71 cents to J.C. Robinson, agent of the Moonakis Factory”
(Emerson 1963:141). In order to find a record of someone selling wool to a Falmouth
factory, one has to leave Falmouth and go to nearby Naushon Island. While this sale was
from 1863, it more than likely reflects a long-standing relationship for reasons explained
shortly. The entry from Naushon shows that the local woolen factories were getting much
of their wool from a source that was still local and not from the west, which contradicts
the AGS model. So if Falmouth farmers were not raising sheep to sell to woolen
factories, what were they doing with it? According to HARCCI, the most likely purpose
of raising sheep and selling their wool is for making “home manufactures” or woolen
cloth either for home consumption or resale sometimes as far afield as Boston.96
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What makes the absence of wool sales to the factories even more glaring is that
John Robinson makes an appearance in the Gifford minute books in 1839, but not to
purchase wool. The 1837-1848 minute book records the following “3rd mo. 5th 1838--Paid John Robinson for Dressing Cloth for Maltiah--- $0.60.”97 This entry indicates that
the Giffords by this time are buying cloth from a factory instead of making their own.
This meticulousness of their records makes the absence of any sales of wool to the
factories or their owners all the more glaring. If they had made any sales to them, they
would have recorded it, and yet in all of their surviving minute books that cover the
period of 1829-1848, there is not one.98 This runs counter to what the AGS model and
Wilson say should have happened.
It might be pointed out that perhaps the absence of wool sales by the Giffords to
the Moonakis Woolen Factory, or to the Pacific Woolen Factory, is exclusive to only the
Giffords. Perhaps other local farmers in Falmouth sold wool to these factories, but their
minute books are lost. An examination of the linear notes from the Moonakis time book,
however, shows that this is not the case. As stated before, the Moonakis time book is
mainly a record of the hours worked by employees as well as the amount of cloth
produced. More importantly, the back pages include a series of notations which record
sales of wool to the Moonakis Factory as well as a record of people who paid the factory
a fee to have their wool processed into cloth.99
It appears that all of these deliveries of wool were by sea. The list notes
repeatedly that a Captain Hamlin brought wool in and shipped finished products out.100
This would make a great deal of sense in light of the fact that John and Henry Robinson,
the owners of the Moonakis Factory along with Abner Hinckley, owned two wharves and
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a total of seven packet ships.101 Wool was brought in on their ships and offloaded at their
wharves. Finished goods went out of their wharves on their ships, bound more than likely
for Nantucket, based on a letter from L. Swain to J. Robinson found in the time book.102
It would be faster and easier, in terms of raw wool, to deal with Nantucket or even
Naushon Island, both of which had farmers with much larger herds than the farmers of
Falmouth. Naushon Island was owned exclusively in this time period by the Bowdoin
family and in 1817 had 4000 sheep. Dealing with the myriad of local sheep farmers and
the small herds that existed in Falmouth or anywhere on the mainland Cape would have
been time consuming.
The fact is that the Robinsons and Abner Hinckley had the means to access larger
sheep herds, and it appears that they used this access. None of the names of suppliers in
the time book are local farmers. Neither Robert Chisolm, who delivered 265 lbs. of
unwashed wool and had it processed into 4 bales of cloth, nor William Mackey, who sold
524 lbs. pounds of wool to the factory, are recorded in the State Valuations or Town
Assessments as living in Falmouth. None of the other names that appear, except Captain
Hamlin, was a resident of Falmouth.103
The conclusions that can be drawn from the time book are that the Giffords were
not the only farmers who did not do business with the factories of Falmouth. It appears
that at least in the case of the Moonakis Woolen Factory, the owners had the means
through their wharves and ships to avoid dealing with local farmers, and, based on the
information contained in the time book, they utilized those means to do just that. While
no evidence remains to indicate whether the Pacific Woolen Mill followed the same
policy, based on their absence from the Gifford minute books as well as the fact that they
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had a similar access to ships and wharves in the person of Stephen Dillingham (as well as
connections with New Bedford), it is more than likely that they also avoided using
Falmouth farmers as wool suppliers.104
This raises an obvious question: why would the Moonakis Woolen Factory and
the Pacific Woolen Factory avoid using local sources of wool from the very beginning?
There are two answers to that question. The first can be found in the oral testimony given
by Orrin Bourne. Orrin Bourne, as stated earlier, worked as a young boy along with his
father in the Moonakis Woolen Factory. His testimony gives the details of the day-to-day
operations of the woolen mill, but far more important was what he had to say concerning
the owners’ attitudes towards the local sheep farmers. According to Orrin, the owners of
the factory hated using the local sheep farmers as a source of wool. The owners felt that
the local farmers were “unreliable” as a source.105 Despite the fact that Orrin and his
father worked at the factory in the 1870’s and 1880’s, long after the Giffords, this state of
affairs was likely true in the 1830’s, because the local farmers always diversified. This
leads to the second answer. It is very likely that the local farmers got around to the sheep
when they were ready and able, and not when the factories needed wool; after all, their
land was fertile and they had other income options beside wool. That fact alone would
make them unreliable, whereas the Bowdoin family, with its 4000 sheep on Naushon,
was focused on sheep and nothing else. Logically, they were much better suppliers. Any
business needs a secure and steady supply of raw materials in order to operate properly
and it seems that farmers of Falmouth, because of their independent natures and
economic diversification, could or would not provide that secure and steady supply of
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wool that the factories needed. Thus the factories found wool suppliers in places like
Naushon and Nantucket instead of Falmouth.106
When the data from the Giffords’ minute books are combined with the Moonakis
time book and the testimony of Orrin Bourne, there appears to be no relationship between
the woolen factories and the sheep farmers in Falmouth. It appears that the Falmouth
farmers did not sell wool to either the Moonakis Woolen Factory nor the Pacific Woolen
Factory, either because the woolen mills would not buy it or because the farmers had
better income sources and chose not to sell; most likely, it was a combination of both.
The AGS model and Wilson state that there should be a tight relationship of supply and
demand between the owners of sheep and the woolen mills, and yet in Falmouth there is
no evidence supporting that assertion; in fact, the evidence asserts the contrary The AGS
model purports that the relationship between the two is a result of the infertility of New
England soil (Baker and Izzard 1991:33), and yet in the case of Falmouth it may be that
the fertility of its soils was what prevented the creation of just that relationship.
Comparison of Timelines
When the timeline for the AGS model is compared to the local evidence from
Falmouth, the local evidence does not support the model’s timing for the collapse (see
Table 3). An examination of the State Valuations of 1831 and 1840 as well as the
Falmouth Town Assessments of 1832-33, 1835, 1836, 1837, and 1839, reveals a pattern
of sheep growth that starts out as the AGS model suggests, but which diverges wildly in
terms of the timing of the collapse107. As demonstrated previously, the farmers of
Falmouth, including the brothers Gifford, experienced a period of either stability or
growth in terms of the number of sheep between 1831 and 1835108. A good example of
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the farmers who experienced more stable sheep herds would be Prince and Maltiah
Gifford. Between 1831 and 1835, the number of sheep owned by them remained stable
with a slight fluctuation109. Generally most of the farmers in Falmouth followed a pattern
of stability like the Giffords, though there were a number of farmers who experienced a
rapid increase110 like Elijah Swift111. Taken altogether, the pattern revealed is one of
increase, though perhaps not to the extent that the AGS model suggests for New England
as a whole.
Where the evidence from the state valuations and the town assessments really
diverge from the AGS model is in the timing of the collapse. According to authors of the
AGS model, the late 1830s and early 1840s were when the sheep industry and the
population of sheep reached its greatest climax (Turner 1931:158-159), but this is not the
case in Falmouth. An examination of the state valuations and the town assessments
reveals that there is a hiccup in the population of sheep in Falmouth in 1836112. While
many of the sheep farmers in the town maintained the same number of sheep, a number
began to record lower numbers. Elijah Swift, for example, had no sheep at all by 1836113.
Beginning in 1837, the number of sheep in the town as a whole began to decline
swiftly. Between 1837 and 1840, it seems that most of the farmers in Falmouth
abandoned sheep altogether.114 Overall, the number of sheep in Falmouth declined from
2973 in 1831 to 1338 in 1840, with all of the decrease happening between 1836 and
1840.115 This is in direct contradiction to the AGS model which says that this period
should be the one of greatest increase (Goldthwait1927:546). In essence, the decline that
should be happening according to the AGS model in the mid-1840s is happening in
Falmouth in the mid-to-late 1830’s.
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Railroads and Timeline
Ignoring the obvious problem of a lack of relationship between the woolen
factories and the sheep farmers of Falmouth in the local evidence, it might be argued that
the underlying reason for the decline put forth by AGS model, namely, the introduction
of cheap western goods, could still be explanatory for Falmouth, even if the timing is not
(Turner 1931:158-159). Entertaining the argument that perhaps there was a relationship
between the factories and farmers of Falmouth undocumented in extant records, the
collapse of the sheep industry in Falmouth might have been like the canary in the coal
mine – a harbinger of things to come. Its position on the coast made Falmouth vulnerable
to the changing economic forces and forecast what was to come for the rest of New
England the following decade. The problem here is that the timing is still wrong, only
this time it is about railroads and not sheep. The earliest railroad to reach Cape Cod was
finished in 1848, and while it probably did bring western agricultural goods to the Cape,
its arrival is far too late to be a cause of a collapse that occurred in 1836-1837.116
It might be argued that the rail line to the Cape was not needed to introduce
western goods into the Cape and Falmouth markets. Packet ships could have brought
these goods to Falmouth from Boston, as packets regularly did ply the waters between the
two destinations. The problem again is one of timing. While Boston was the hub of an
expanding railroad system, that railroad system did not connect to the west until 1841,
when the Albany to Boston line was completed (Turner 1931:173-174). The
transportation costs of shipping western goods to the New England market up to that date
would have been high enough to allow New England goods like wool to be competitive,
but afterwards, according to the AGS model, the low price of production in the west
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would have allowed them to continue to make a profit, even as they drove the price of
wool down by flooding the market (Wilson 1935:19-20). It is still too late to explain a
collapse that occurred in the 1836-1837 time period. Western wool would not have been
all that cheap before this date, so its arrival in Falmouth would not have caused a problem
for the town’s farmers trying to sell wool to the local factories, and therefore could not
have caused the collapse.
The Persistence of Farmers
Perhaps it could be argued that the farmers of Falmouth perceived that the price of
wool would collapse once a rail line between Boston and Albany was completed, and so
voluntarily abandoned sheep before a glut in the market, caused by cheap western goods,
forced them to do so. Based on their behavior in regards to the salt works, however, this
is highly unlikely. As stated before, many of the farmers of Falmouth were involved in
the production of salt. According to John Hoag Dillingham, this industry was so
important that they often ignored all else to tend to the coastal salt works (Smith
1986:434). What is of special interest is how these men reacted to the continually falling
price of salt after 1812. Competition from salt springs in Virginia and New York drove
the price of salt per bushel down from $7.00 in 1812 to $1.00 in 1829, yet in response the
farmers in Falmouth continued to increase the square footage of their salt works to
1,844,040 feet in 1831 (Smith 1986:66). Even after the bounty on salt offered by the state
of Massachusetts was withdrawn in 1834 and the tariff on foreign salt was eliminated by
Congress in 1840, bringing the prices even lower, the farmers continued to operate the
salt works (Smith 1986:66). The State Valuation of 1840 lists 1,659,020 feet of salt works
in operation. Even after the price of salt per bushel came down to 42 cents per bushel in
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1850, there were still salt works in operation. The last one closed in 1870 (Smith
1986:66). The point is that the local farmers would have continued full sheep production
until at least 1841. They would not have abandoned something even remotely profitable
simply because in 1836, they thought sheep might not be profitable after 1841.
Ultimately, however, it appears the farmers of Falmouth, never thought there was
a profit to be had from the factories. The surviving evidence from the minute books and
time book as well as the testimony of Orrin Bourne makes it clear that there was no
relationship between the sheep farmers and the factories. The local farmers in Falmouth
seem not to have concentrated enough on sheep production to provide the constant supply
of wool that the factories in Falmouth needed to be profitable. Because they had other
and preferred means of making a profit, such as the salt works, wood cutting or even
grain production, they were, in the words of the owners of factories, “unreliable.” 117
Without a relationship between the woolen factories and the local farmers, the AGS
model cannot explain the timing of the collapse. The Falmouth farmers would never have
been affected by any competition from the west for they were never suppliers of wool for
the local factories to begin with.
Explanations Based on the Evidence
This leaves two rather obvious questions. First, if the Falmouth farmers did not
raise sheep to sell the wool to the local factories, they must have been raising them for
other purposes. Second, if the AGS model does not explain the reasons for the collapse of
the sheep industry, there must be other causes for the collapse. In 1830s Falmouth, the
local farmers collectively possessed the largest sheep herds on mainland Cape Cod, yet
the evidence suggests that these sheep were not raised to provide wool for the local
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woolen factories.118 The HARCCI, the writings of local historians, and the state
valuations and Falmouth assessments all suggest that the farmers of Falmouth raised the
sheep for the purpose of “home manufacture.” In other words, they were using the wool
from their sheep to make their own clothes.119 According to HARCCI, this had been the
case since the Wool Act of 1699. The HARCCI goes on to say that aside from making
clothes for themselves, the farmers also made clothes for resale, especially stockings and
other knitted goods. As the profits from this trade increased, they stimulated the creation
of fulling mills and carding mills in Falmouth from 1788 onward. The farmers came to
rely on the fulling and carding mills to make finer quality products for sale.120 This
relationship was remembered by the older people Virtue B. Gifford interviewed in the
late 1800s and early 1900s. They remembered bringing wool to be carded and children
being sent out into the fields to find thorns to use as pins for the rolls. The rolls were then
brought back to the farms and woven into cloth.121 Since there was no woolen factory in
Falmouth before 1831, every sale of wool recorded in the Gifford minute books was
undoubtedly for home manufacture, earning income for the Giffords, thus providing the
reason for keeping the herds of sheep. Because the woolen factories already had more
reliable suppliers of wool when they set up shop in Falmouth, they never reoriented the
local wool production towards anything but home textile production.
Falmouth farmers abandoned sheep farming in the 1830s for complex reasons. To
begin with, up until 1831 the farmers of Falmouth raised sheep for homemade woolens,
as they had for over one hundred years. According to the state valuations and town
assessments, this relationship between home manufacture and the sheep herds supported
three carding mills and two fulling mills, which means until at least that date, the
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relationship appears to have been a healthy one with profits made all around, or at least
enough to support the carding and fulling mills.122
This stable state of affairs lasted until 1831 when the first woolen factory opened
its doors in Falmouth. The effect of this event was, according to the HARCCI was as
follows: “With the rise of mechanized factory production, home textile manufacture and
local fulling became outmoded” (1987:298). The arrival of the first factory spelled the
death of home textile manufacture in Falmouth and with it the industries that it supported,
namely the carding and fulling mills. The Town Assessment of 1833 notes that two years
after the arrival of the first woolen mill and one year after the creation of a second one,
there was only one carding mill and one fulling mill left in the town.123 The most likely
explanation for the disappearance of the carding and fulling mills is the abandonment of
home textile manufacture in favor of factory-made cloth. This abandonment can be seen
in the Gifford minute books after 1831, where wool sales plummeted to nothing, with the
exception of three sales in 1836.124 The arrival of factories and the concomitant decline of
home manufacture did not immediately put an end to the sheep herds, which would not
be for another three years, but it did remove the main reason that made raising sheep
profitable.
There is no surviving evidence showing why there was a three-year delay between
the disappearance of the carding and fulling mills and the decline in the number of sheep
in Falmouth. The fact that there was a jump in the overall number of sheep between 1834
and 1835 tentatively supports the idea that the local farmers thought that they were going
to find a market for their wool and the most likely market would have been the local
factories or that they would continue to earn income from mutton sales.125
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The local farmers held onto their sheep, and in some cases even increased the
herds, until 1836 even though they were not making much money from them. An analysis
of the Giffords’ minute books reveals that in the 1834-1835 period, the Giffords were
supporting 71 sheep and yet were only making $10.07.126 Wilson states that in New
England, the average cost of taking care of a single sheep was two dollars per year in the
1830’s (1935:20), regardless of whether it was being raised for wool or mutton. If Wilson
is right, then once home textile production died out, farmers like the Giffords were losing
money by keeping sheep. In good times perhaps this loss was acceptable when balanced
against the possible profits that the farmers hoped to make at some future date, but times
did not stay good. A number of events were to come together which would adversely
affect sheep numbers.
Falmouth’s Sheep and the Regional and National Economy
As stated before, the Falmouth economy began to enter into a period of extreme
decline probably around 1837, based on the sharp drop in beef sales.127 It certainly was at
crisis level by 1840 when the state valuation recorded that the town had only $28,812 in
stock in trade, down from $69,297 in 1831.128The cause of this collapse was more than
likely the events occurring in the country as a whole at the time. President Jackson’s
wildcat banks, which he created to undermine the Bank of the United States, had by 1836
printed so much paper currency that the Federal Government was forced to issue the
order that only gold or silver, called specie, would be accepted for land sales. This caused
a run on the banks, as people tried to redeem their paper notes for gold and silver that the
wildcat banks did not possess. The resulting panic of 1837 caused “the collapse of the
credit system” and “bankrupted hundreds of businesses and put more than a third of the

94

population out of work” (Danzer, et al. 2007:233-234). That this panic occurred in the
same year that Falmouth’s economy began to decline suggests that there is a relationship
between the two.
Also occurring in 1836 was a devastating fire in Nantucket, Falmouth’s primary
market. While not quite as bad as the 1846 fire that occurred there, nevertheless it
affected operations on the island for at least two years following the fire (Kelley
2006:67). In 1836 Nantucket sent out 30 whaling ships, yet in 1837 and 1838, only 21
were deployed (Starbuck 1989:326, 336, 346). Less money made as a result of fewer
ships sent out would mean fewer goods would be purchased from suppliers in Falmouth,
and this would cause an overall decline in revenues for a town that relied on Nantucket as
its primary market. On top of all of these problems, there may have been a disease which
killed off a large number of sheep in Falmouth. The local evidence for this is nonexistent, but data from nearby Naushon reports a large sheep mortality for 1836 (Emerson
1963:137). The island of Naushon is only a few miles from Falmouth, so it is possible
that this mortality may have affected Falmouth as well, but no documentary evidence
remains to testify to it.
While no diary records why the farmers of Falmouth abandoned their sheep after
1836, the fact that it happened after the confluence of all the above events makes it likely
that it was result of the economic stresses put upon an industry that no longer made
enough money to support itself. The local farmers could no longer afford to maintain the
number of sheep that they had, especially in light of the reality that the local factories had
no interest in buying wool from them. Being practical, they abandoned the raising of the
sheep for wool (and thus large herds) and refocused their energies into more profitable
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areas of production such as raising onions or grain or cutting cord wood, which the
productivity of the land gave them the option to do.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

Matthew Johnson, in An Archaeology of Capitalism, proposes that “specific
contexts must be explored on their own terms before drawing out wider implications”
(Johnson 1996:95). Johnson’s case study approach is the opposite of those which employ
the AGS model, approaches that take the broader narrative and impose it on specific
contexts. In the case of Falmouth, this broader narrative has proven inapplicable. The
model has a simplified mechanism, with an emphasis on the infertility of the land forcing
farmers into a supply-and-demand relationship with factories based on wool production.
The subsequent increase in the number of sheep, followed by a rapid decline once
improved transportation, like canals and railroads, allowed factories to buy much cheaper
wool from the west, does not fit with the local evidence at all (Wilson 1935:13-23). The
reason, as Johnson would point out, is that this model was produced from studies far
removed from the physical, social, and economic realities of this specific community
(1996:68). A microhistorial approach is much more useful in analyzing the Falmouth data
and how or if it might fit the AGS model.
Part of the physical reality of Falmouth was that sheep were important in the town
almost from the very beginning. As described in Chapter 2, the needs of sheep suited the
land in Falmouth, and they influenced the layout of land boundaries and the uses of the
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land, but to use a colloquialism, they were not the only game in town. Sharing the
landscape with the sheep were farms on productive soil that raised grains, hay, onions,
and other cash crops.129 These farmers used the profits they made to invest in the
wharves and ships that lay along the coastline. Those shorelines were also dotted with
salt works that generated much revenue for their owners, who used these profits, along
with earnings they made by trading with Nantucket and other locations, to invest in
creating center villages with banks and new meeting houses built in the Federal style.130
Because the soil was productive, it allowed the farmers to invest in other industries in the
town, such as fulling and carding mills to assist local residents with their household
needs, and eventually the construction of woolen factories, which met market needs at
greater distances.
As the data in Chapter 3 reveal, the sheep raising industry was prosperous in the
beginning of the 1830’s in Falmouth, but during the decade of crisis, it began a steep
decline, as the farmers focused on other agricultural industries. Socially, in the early part
of the decade, sheep were a concern of town government, both in the appointment of
town shepherds and in arguments over where they could roam, but they were not the only
focus of the local economy. In the state valuations, sheep only received one column
among many agricultural columns that denoted such variables as acres of tillage land and
multiple forms of livestock. Different kinds of grains comprised five columns, and
various kinds of buildings each received their own categories. Other columns which were
of concern to the inhabitants included salt works, wharves, and ships. Sheep were
important but not the only mode of production the town kept its eye on.131 The fact that
there were people who kept trying to get the sheep restricted to the owners’ properties
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year after year (they succeeded by 1854) indicates that the society was conflicted over the
issue of sheep, and that many townspeople felt that the town would survive their
removal.132
Economically, the purpose the sheep served was to provide mutton and to provide
wool for home textile production, either for the farmer’s use or for resale. This had been
the case in Falmouth and for much of New England since at least 1699.133 The difference
between Falmouth and places like the towns in New Hampshire and Vermont examined
by Goldthwait and Wilson is that, once factories came to Falmouth and made home
textile manufacturing obsolete, the farmers of Falmouth failed to become the suppliers of
raw wool to the local factories (Goldthwait 1927:527-552; Wilson 1935:12-40). Evidence
suggests the reason for this was that the local factories found the farmers unreliable and
thus found suppliers in other nearby locations such as Naushon Island.134 Perhaps this
perceived unreliability was the result of the complex interplay between the farmers and a
land that offered them multiple options for profit, with the result being a decision on the
part of the farmers not to abandon these other means of working the land just so they
could be more attractive suppliers of wool. For the Giffords, cutting cordwood, tending
the salt works, or becoming involved in raising cattle was more profitable than raising
sheep. Later on, in the 1840s, the Giffords made more profit from onions than they did
from both the sale of wool or mutton in the 1830s. 135 Diversification was in part a
strategy to minimize risks of farming.
It was this collective group of realities which formed the framework of the
collapse of the sheep industry in Falmouth after 1836, and not the realities promulgated
by the AGS between 1930 and 1950. The simple, elegant explanation offered by authors
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like Goldthwait, Wilson, and Black, detailed in Chapter 4, does not match the more
complex interplay of both the local actors (farmers and factory owners) and the regional
economy with the realities of Falmouth at this time. Instead of stimulating the growth of
the sheep industry, per the AGS model, the arrival of the woolen factories destroyed the
home textile industry, removing most of the profit from raising sheep. Whether or not this
is a part of a larger issue of commodity substitution is impossible to say without further
investigation. What can be said is that after the arrival of factories in Falmouth, the
demand for home manufactured woolen goods decreased rapidly. Decisions made by
factory owners as well as decisions made by farmers, both in an interplay with local and
regional demands, ensured that no supply-and-demand relationship ever developed
between the two in regards to wool. With no relationship between the two, the AGS
model of sheep farmers failing to compete with cheap western wool becomes useless and
irrelevant as an explanation for the disappearance of sheep in Falmouth. Upon closer
examination, the lack of connection between timing of the collapse (1836) and the arrival
of Western goods en masse by railroad (1841) only serves to reinforce the irrelevance of
western goods as a cause.
In Falmouth the real reasons for the collapse were much more complex. They
involved both a separate regional and national economic crisis: the Nantucket fire of
1836 and the Panic of 1837. They may have also been compounded by a livestock
epidemic that appears to have swept through the sheep herds of Naushon and possibly
Falmouth at the time. Most importantly, they involved a cost-benefit analysis that the
local farmers must have made as the economy fell apart around them. In that cost-benefit
analysis, they concluded that sheep were too expensive to maintain in tight economic
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times and were not worth supporting. Even at this point, they did not try to establish a
supply-and-demand relationship with the factories, perhaps because they still felt that
being the wool suppliers for the local factories was still not the most profitable option. As
evidenced by the data in Chapters 3 and 5, the Gifford minute books do not record what
Prince and Maltiah were thinking, but do record that after 1836, the Giffords did not try
to revive their sheep herds and instead put more effort into hay production and wood
cutting.136 The state valuations and the town assessments make it clear that just about all
of the farmers in Falmouth followed a similar path in abandoning sheep at about the same
time.
Does the failure of the AGS model to explain the collapse of the sheep industry
in Falmouth indicate a failure in the model as a whole, or does it mean that Falmouth is
merely an exception to the rule? Michael Bell in his paper “Did New England Go
Downhill?” notes that crop productivity for New England as a whole was very high as
late as 1879. He goes on further to cite The Report on the Production of Agriculture:
Tenth Census in which he notes that
New England exceeded the national average for corn by 19 percent . . . [and] for
wheat by 16 percent . . . [and] high yields of vegetables supported a large export
and canning industry…Vegetable farming in the Boston basin was so successful
that produce was shipped widely, even dominating the winter market in late
nineteenth-century Florida (Bell 1989:457).
If Bell’s numbers are correct, then places like Petersham, MA and Lyme Township, NH,
and the AGS model developed from them, are the exceptions and not the rule.
This does not mean that Falmouth could be the basis for a new model to cover all
of New England. In fact, there are probably dozens of towns in New England with
completely different circumstances that would generate models very different from
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Falmouth’s pattern or the AGS model. There is no doubt that the AGS model was
applicable in towns like Lyme Township and Petersham, and other similar places which
did have poor soils and a heavy reliance on producing wool for factories, but those towns
were not representative of the entirety of New England. The model’s total failure to
explain events in Falmouth and its contradiction by Bell’s data reveal what may be the
underlying flaws in the model. The model generalizes by taking the causes and events
that occur in a small number of towns and projects them on the region as a whole. The
model also oversimplifies what appears to be a much more complex interplay between
the economy, the society, the environment, and individual actions. The AGS model, by
taking this unicausal approach, obscures the much more complex skein of actors,
landscapes, and environments into which it fits. The creation of a landscape geared
toward both agriculture and husbandry and the development of Falmouth’s center village
in the early 1800s were not singular causes of developments in the town but reflections of
its culture and people.
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